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Climate Regulation and the Limits of
Cost-Benefit Analysis
Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner*
Over the past two years U.S. regulatory agencies have issued
fourteen regulations that take into account the effect of industrial
activities andproducts on the global climate. The regulatory activity
so far has alreadyset precedents on whichfuture regulation will rest.
Yet despite the potentially momentous consequences, it has received
no comment in the law review literature. This Article examines the
record of these agencies and criticizes the methods they have used to
calculate the social cost of carbon emissions. We also develop a
larger theme about the relationshipbetween cost-benefit analysis and
politics. The best case for cost-benefit analysis is that its
recommendations are politically neutral in the sense of drawing on
widely shared intuitions about human well-being. But cost-benefit
analysis cannot cope with inherently political questions involving
contested normative issues. Policymakers will have tofind alternative
tools when those questionspredominate.
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INTRODUCTION

There is a broad consensus that global warming threatens the well-being
of people around the world, and that national governments should take steps to
curb warming and alleviate the harm that climate change causes.' After
dragging its heels, the United States has joined most other countries in
recognizing that action against climate change is needed.2 Nonetheless, the
United States has not ratified any international climate change treaty. Congress
has considered, but not passed, greenhouse gas regulation. 3 And the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has not yet proposed broad carbon
dioxide regulation, despite having been authorized to do so by the Supreme
Court.5 To all appearances, the federal government is at a point of stasisdeliberating, but not acting, on the issue of climate change.
Yet this appearance of stasis is misleading: in fact, the American
regulatory state has lurched into gear. Over the past two years, several federal

1. See, e.g., WILLIAM NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: WEIGHING THE OPTIONS ON
GLOBAL WARMING POLICIES (2008); NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE:
THE STERN REVIEW (2007); RICHARD B. STEWART & JONATHAN B. WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING
CLIMATE POLICY: BEYOND KYOTO (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and
China? The Complex Climate Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA
L. REV. 1675 (2008); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 S. CAL. L.
REV. 905 (2008). We agree with this consensus. See ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE
CHANGE JUSTICE (2010); Daniel Abebe & Jonathan S. Masur, InternationalAgreements, Internal
Heterogeneity, andClimate Change: The "Two Chinas" Problem, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 325 (2010).

2. See Conference of the Parties, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7-19, 2009, Report of the Conference of the Parties, Fifteenth Session,
CopenhagenAccord, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/1 I/Add. 1 (Mar. 30, 2010).
3.

See Pery Bacon, Jr., Lack of Votes for Senate Democrats' Energy Bill May Mean the End,

WASH. POST, July 23, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/22/
AR2010072203614.html ("Conceding that they can't find enough votes for the legislation, Senate
Democrats on Thursday abandoned efforts to put together a comprehensive energy bill that would seek
to curb greenhouse gas emissions . . . .").
4. The EPA has taken the more limited step of requiring that major carbon dioxide emitters
obtain permits. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71). We discuss
this regulation below. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
5. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) ("Because greenhouse gases fit well
within the Clean Air Act's capacious definition of 'air pollutant,' we hold that EPA has the statutory
authority to regulate the emission of such gases from new motor vehicles.").
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agencies, most notably the Departments of Energy and Transportation, have
issued fourteen regulations that take into account the effect of industrial
activities and products on the global climate. The regulatory activity so far
involves relatively small-scale projects, for example, energy standards for
appliances like air conditioners and gas ranges. But these early efforts by
agencies to engage in climate regulation reveal the numerous challenges they
face, and how they will likely meet these challenges when they turn to largerscale regulation involving power plants, motor vehicle regulation, and
manufacturing. Although these efforts are setting precedents on which future
regulation will rest, commentators have yet to acknowledge their existence or
analyze their potentially far-reaching consequences.
The story begins in 2008, when the Ninth Circuit struck down the
Department of Transportation's (DOT) Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) standard for light trucks because the cost-benefit analysis the DOT
used to determine the standard failed to take account of the standard's
beneficial effects for climate change.6 The petitioners, which included a
number of environmental groups, had tried to persuade the court that the DOT
should not have used cost-benefit analysis, which they believed was impermissible under the statute. The court rejected this argument but agreed with the
petitioners that if the DOT uses cost-benefit analysis, then it cannot arbitrarily
include some benefits-reduction in automobile noise and congestion, for
example-while excluding the benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
In response to this ruling, the DOT monetized the climate benefits.
So it was cost-benefit analysis that initiated climate regulation at the
federal level. Environmentalists have frequently argued that cost-benefit
analysis is a political tool that government agencies use to avoid regulation.9
They have harshly criticized Executive Order 12,866, a Clinton-era executive
order that requires regulatory agencies to issue cost-benefit analyses for major
regulations.' 0 Yet this order supplied the DOT with the authority to engage in
cost-benefit analysis of CAFE standards, which in turn led to judicial
repudiation because the DOT's cost-benefit analysis ignored climatic effects. In

6. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172,
1198-203 (9th Cir. 2008).
7. Id. at 1201.
8. See Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for New Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards, 76 Fed. Reg. 26,996 (May 10, 2011) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R.
pts. 531 & 533).
9. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE
OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 9-11 (2004); Amy Sinden et al., Cost-Benefit
Analysis: New Foundationson Shfiing Sand, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 48,50 (2009).
10. The Clinton order renewed an earlier order issued by President Reagan, which may explain
the association between cost-benefit analysis and conservative, antiregulatory sentiment. See
MATrfHEW ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIr ANALYSIS 1-5 (2006).
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this instance, the argument that cost-benefit analysis promotes needed
regulation may have been vindicated."
Or has it? A close reading of the cost-benefit analyses performed by
agencies in connection with climate regulation reveals much to worry about.
There is a wide gap between the theory of cost-benefit analysis and agencies'
performance.
In theory, the relevant monetary valuations for cost-benefit analysis of
climate regulation would come from climate science and economics. The
science establishes the approximate effects of carbon emissions on the climate.
The economics converts these effects into monetary valuations based on their
impact on people's consumption patterns. Thus, one can establish that an
additional metric ton of carbon emissions will cause long-term disruptions to
climate patterns that will interfere with agriculture, raise sea levels, and so
forth, which will either directly injure people (for example, through an increase
in the price of food) or require expensive remedial measures (such as the
construction of sea walls). Agencies should use this figure-known as the
social cost of carbon (SCC)-in cost-benefit analyses of regulations.
However, the science does not produce fine-grained predictions with a
high level of confidence. It is possible to predict that the median global
temperature will rise, but not that temperatures or rainfall will be disrupted in a
crucial agricultural region. Yet the latter information is necessary for an
adequate cost-benefit analysis. The economics poses even greater difficulties.
The three major economic models on which agencies rely are extraordinarily
crude. The cost of climate change will be high, but it is not clear how high, and
one cannot conduct cost-benefit analysis of a regulation without knowing what
its economic effect will be.
The regulatory agencies recognize these problems and so far have
performed curious evasive maneuvers. They calculate a range of costs rather
than a point estimate, then they observe that their calculations depend on
assumptions that are little more than guesses, and then they announce that
specifying a precise figure is irrelevant because the regulation passes a costbenefit test given any of the possible social costs of carbon. Agencies often
refer to this as a "sensitivity test"-determining whether the regulation is
sensitive to the price placed on alleviating carbon emissions. For example, in a
2008 regulation of air conditioners and heat pumps, the Department of Energy
(DOE) estimated that the social cost of carbon fell somewhere between $0 and
$20 per ton,12 and then declined to use any SCC figure in its cost-benefit
11. See, e.g., RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIvERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY:
How COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 18-19
(2008); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 291-93

(2002).
12. Packaged Terminal Air Conditioner and Packaged Terminal Heat Pump Energy
Conservation Standards, 73 Fed. Reg. 58,772, 58,814 (Oct. 7, 2008) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt.

HeinOnline -- 99 Cal. L. Rev. 1560 2011

2011]

CLIMATE REGULA TION AND COST-BENEFITANALYSIS

1561

analysis on the grounds that the "economic value of emissions reduction is not
priced in the marketplace."' 3 In a 2009 regulation of fuel economy standards,
the DOT calculated separately a $2 domestic SCC and a $33 global SCC, and
then used these figures in a sensitivity test but not in the cost-benefit analysis.14
Meanwhile, in 2008 the EPA estimated SCCs of $68 per ton (using a 2 percent
discount rate15) and $40 per ton (using a 3 percent discount rate) in an advance
notice of proposed rulemaking under the Clean Air Act,1 6 but did not say which
figure should be used.
In response to this confusion, the Office of Management and Budget
convened an Interagency Working Group (IWG). The resulting document
contains a highly sophisticated and carefully written survey of the academic
work, emphasizing that many uncertainties remain in the science and
economics. It proposes a range of SCCs reflecting different assumptions about
7
the appropriate discount rate and the year in which the regulation is issued.1
For 2010, the SCC was $4.70 at a discount rate of 5 percent, $21.40 at a
8
discount rate of 3 percent, and $35.10 at a discount rate of 2.5 percent. The
IWG does not instruct agencies which discount rate to use. Since the IWG
figures were issued, agencies have stopped making their own calculations and
have instead relied on the IWG figures. But they have generally ignored the
SCC when performing the cost-benefit analysis used to justify their regulations
and instead employed it only in sensitivity tests.
This reluctance to employ the SCC in cost-benefit analysis extends to
contexts beyond direct agency regulation. For instance, in June 2010, three
months after the publication of the IWG report, the EPA performed an analysis
of the American Power Act, a cap-and-trade climate bill.' 9 After extensively
analyzing the potential costs of the legislation, the EPA announced that it
would not even attempt to estimate the economic benefits of greenhouse gas

430).
13. Id. at 58,797.
14. Average Fuel Economy Standards Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Model Year 2011, 74
Fed. Reg. 14,196, 14,346, 14,351 (Mar. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 531, 533, 534,
536 & 537) [hereinafter 2011 CAFE Standards].
The discount rate is a number that is multiplied with a future payoff in order to transform it
15.
to present value. A positive discount rate implies that the future payoff is worth less than a present
payoff of the same value.
16. Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354,
44,416 (proposed July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).
17. See INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL COST OF CARBON, TECHNICAL
SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866, at 40-A1 (2010) [hereinafter IWG REPORT], available at
http://www.epa.gov/oms/climate/regulations/scc-tsd.pdf
18. Id.at40.
19. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF ATMOSPHERIC PROGRAMS, EPA ANALYSIS OF
THE AMERICAN POWER ACT IN THE IllTH CONGRESS (June 30, 2010), available at
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/economics/pdfs/EPAAPAAnalysis_6-14- 10.pdf.
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reductions. 20 This was despite the fact that the EPA had just finished a project
designed to produce exactly such an estimate.
This Article examines the record of the agencies and the reasoning in the
IWG report. In Part I, we show how agencies purported to conduct cost-benefit
analyses, but structured their analyses so as to avoid relying on any given SCC
value. In Part II, we turn to the IWG report to explore specific technical
problems for arriving at a value for the SCC, and the political questions
inherent in selecting a SCC for use in domestic regulation.
We write on a blank slate. Legal scholars have analyzed the prospects for
an international agreement on climate change; 21 the possible forms of federal
climate legislation;22 the future of the EPA regulation under the Clean Air
Act; 23 and the possibility that greenhouse gases might be regulated by states
and localities,24 or through litigation.25 But the national regulatory efforts
already underway have escaped their notice.

20.
21.

Id at 19.
See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh & Mark A. Cohen, Climate Change Governance:

Boundaries and Leakage, 18 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 221 (2010) (describing mechanisms to create
incentives for major developing nations to reduce emissions); Vandenbergh, supra note 1 (analyzing
the difficulty of bringing both China and the United States on board with an international agreement on
climate change); Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate

Policies,155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961 (2007) (describing the international nature of climate change and the
need for an international solution); Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two
Protocols, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2007) (discussing the need for, and difficulties with, an
international climate accord).
22.

See, e.g., Gilbert E. Metcalf& David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV.

ENvTL. L. REV. 499 (2009) (describing how a legislatively enacted federal carbon tax might be
structured); Lisa Schultz Bressman, The FutureofAgency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 66572 (2010) (discussing the ramifications of climate change legislation on agency structure and
authority); David A. Super, From the Greenhouse to the Poorhouse: Carbon-Emissions Controland

the Rules ofLegislative Joinder, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1093 (2010) (analyzing the leading legislative
options for regulating carbon emissions); Robert L. Glicksman, BalancingMandate andDiscretion in
the Institutional Design of Federal Climate Change Policy, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 196

(2008), http://www.law.northwestern.edullawreview/colloquy/2008/5 (analyzing the question of how
much authority Congress should delegate to the EPA to regulate climate change); Hari M. Osofsky,
Climate Change Legislation in Context, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 245 (2008),
http://www.law.northwestem.edullawreview/colloquy/2008/9 (analyzing the different pressures on
legislative action).
23. See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, Climate Change Confusion and the Supreme Court: The
Misguided Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 84 NOTRE DAME L.

REV. 1 (2008) (arguing that the EPA should not have been permitted to regulate climate change under
the Clean Air Act); Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnatingthe "MajorQuestions " Exception to Chevron
Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (Or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got It Wrong), 60

ADMIN. L. REv. 593 (2008) (arguing that the Supreme Court should have refused to interfere with the
EPA's decision not to consider regulating carbon dioxide); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate
Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide For Whittling

Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59 (2010) (noting the legal problems involved with agency regulation of
massive issues such as climate change).
24.

See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change "International"?Litigation's Diagonal

Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 585 (2009) (discussing regulation at local, state, federal, and
international levels); Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands On Deck: Local Governments andthe Potential
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While much of our Article is devoted to examining the shortcomings in
both the analyses performed by the agencies and the IWG report, in Part III we
also develop a larger argument about the relationship between cost-benefit
analysis and politics. Although we support cost-benefit analysis for routine
agency action, we believe that some of the criticisms of cost-benefit analysis
have plausibility in the context of climate change. Climate change poses two
problems for cost-benefit analysis. First, there is tremendous uncertainty about
which human beings will be harmed, and where, and how much, and what
weight those harms should have in the cost-benefit calculation. In the absence
of this information, agencies cannot conduct proper cost-benefit analyses.
Second, climate change is an international problem, while U.S. regulatory
practice, including its use of cost-benefit analysis, is oriented to activities with
domestic effect. International relations pose inescapable political questions,
which cost-benefit analysis cannot resolve.
These shortcomings demonstrate the limits of cost-benefit analysis as a
policy tool. The best case for cost-benefit analysis is that its recommendations
are politically neutral in the sense of drawing on widely shared intuitions about
human well-being. 26 Cost-benefit analysis cannot cope with inherently political
questions involving contested normative issues. In some cases, such as abortion,
affirmative action, and religious accommodation, the source of conflict is so
clear that no one seriously argues that regulatory agencies should solve them
using cost-benefit analysis. In other cases, the source of conflict is more subtle.
Instead of looking to cost-benefit analysis to resolve political questions, in
certain cases, policymakers must instead make political judgments. Climate
regulation falls between these two extremes. It is clear that the costs and benefits
of climate regulation are of great importance, and that economic analysis will
have to play a role in climate regulation. But we argue that the formulaic
approach to weighing costs and benefits that is embodied in the standard
methods used by regulatory agencies is not appropriate for this problem.

for BidirectionalClimate Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669 (2010) (exploring the role of local

governments in regulating greenhouse gas production).
25.

See, e.g., Randall S. Abate, PublicNuisance Suitsfor the ClimateJustice Movement: The

Right Thing and the Right Time, 85 WASH. L. REV. 197 (2010) (discussing the increased use of private
law as a means of forcing reductions in carbon emissions); Kirsten H. Engel, HarmonizingRegulatory
and LitigationApproaches to Climate Change Mitigation: IncorporatingTradable Emissions Offsets

into Common Law Remedies, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1563 (2007) (same); see also American Elec. Power
Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010) (granting certiorari in a lawsuit against carbon emitters
brought under state nuisance law).
26. For a defense of this claim, see ADLER & POSNER, supra note 10.

HeinOnline -- 99 Cal. L. Rev. 1563 2011

1564

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99: 1557

I.
CARBON PRICING INEXISTING REGULATIONS

In the past two years, fourteen federal regulations have addressed the
benefits of reduced carbon dioxide emissions.27 Some of these regulations
predate the IWG report and draw upon other calculations of the social cost of
carbon; others obtain their carbon prices directly from the IWG report.
Agencies that depend on pricing carbon run squarely into the problem that there
is no single price: the IWG, for instance, offers four different prices. The
agencies attempt to skirt the problem by claiming that their regulatory choices
do not depend upon the precise cost of carbon selected and that they would
have chosen the identical regulation under any of the possible carbon prices.
In the Sections that follow, we survey three representative regulations:
two promulgated before the IWG report and one that employs the IWG's
carbon prices. These Sections have two purposes. First, we provide a detailed
picture of how federal agencies have already taken up the task of regulating
carbon. Second, we demonstrate that for all of these regulations, the choice of a
carbon price is in fact significant. Agencies cannot simply pretend that their
regulatory decisions are invariant to the SCC; they must actually select a cost
of carbon if they are to regulate intelligently.
A. Model Year 2011 CAFE Standards

One of the earliest federal regulations to incorporate a social cost of
carbon was the Department of Transportation's new set of Corporate Average
Fuel Economy standards for Model Year 2011, issued on March 30, 2009.28
CAFE standards are minimum requirements for the average fuel economy of a
carmaker's entire fleet, adjusted by the number of each automobile sold.
According to the DOT, the majority of the benefits from stricter CAFE
standards stem from savings in the production and distribution of gasoline: if
drivers use less fuel, less money need be spent on producing and distributing
that fuel.29 Nonetheless, one of the most obvious additional benefits of
requiring that automakers produce fuel-efficient automobiles is the reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions. After the Ninth Circuit overturned the DOT's CAFE
standards for model years 2008-2011 for failing to monetize the benefit of
reduced carbon emissions, the DOT went back to the drawing board. 30 The
DOT solicited public comments and then settled on a range of three prices for
the SCC derived from a 2008 article by Richard Tol, who, as we will see, is one

27. We cite them throughout this Part, infra.
28. See 2011 CAFE Standards, supra note 14, at 14,196.
29. Id. at 14,413 tbl.IX-3. According to the DOT, these savings comprise approximately threequarters of the total benefit of fuel economy regulation. See id
30. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172,
1198-203 (9th Cir. 2008).
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of the economists whose work the IWG incorporates. 3' Tol's 2008 article is a
survey of over two hundred separate estimates of the social cost of carbon
published through 2006, over half of which are peer reviewed. 32 The DOT
selected as its middle value the mean price from Tol's survey: $33 per ton of
carbon dioxide. 3 3 The DOT's "high" estimate is one standard deviation above
the mean from Tol's study: $80 per ton of CO 2 -3 4 Like the IWG report, these
prices include all global benefits, foreign and domestic.
For its "low" estimate, the DOT selected its best estimate of the purely
domestic benefits of reducing carbon emissions. 35 It calculated this price by
adjusting Tol's $33 estimate downward based on the "U.S. share of world
economic output (which ranges from 20-28 percent) and published estimates of
the relative sensitivity of the U.S. economy to climate damages compared to the
world economy as a whole." 36 The DOT calculated that the United States
would suffer between 0 and 14 percent of the global costs of climate change,
chose the midpoint of that range (7 percent), and calculated the domestic cost
of carbon as 7 percent of $33, or approximately $2.37 That left the DOT with
three values-$2, $33, and $80-that are roughly similar to the carbon prices
subsequently calculated by the IWG.
These initial carbon prices were denoted in 2007 dollars. The DOT
decided to increase the prices by 2.4 percent in each subsequent year "because
the increased pace and degree of climate change-and thus the resulting
economic damages-caused by additional emissions are both expected to rise
in proportion to the existing concentration of CO 2 in the earth's atmosphere." 39
Crucially, however, these 2.4 percent increases were not pegged to constant
dollars. In other words, if the value of one ton of carbon dioxide were $1.00 in
2007 (in 2007 dollars), it would be $1.024 in 2008 (in 2008 dollars). In order to
determine the value of that 2008 ton of carbon dioxide in constant (2007)
dollars, it would be necessary to discount the $1.024 price back to 2007 dollars.
31.
See 2011 CAFE Standards, supra note 14, at 14,346; Richard S.J. Tol, The Social Cost of
Carbon: Trends, Outliers, and Catastrophes, 2 ECONOMICS-THE OPEN-ACCESS, OPEN-

ASSESSMENT E-JOURNAL, 1-2 (2008), available at http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/
journalarticles/2008-25/version 1.
32. Tol, supra note 31. It is worth noting, however, that approximately half of these estimates
derive from work by Tol himself (independently and with co-authors). See id at 11-16 (listing the
sources for his meta-study).
33. 2011 CAFE Standards, supranote 14, at 14,346.
34. Id It is worth noting that one standard deviation from the mean is approximately the
eighty-fifth percentile of the distribution. Accordingly, this $80 per ton price represents only an eightyfifth percentile estimate, not an upper bound.

35.

Id.

36. Id at 14,349; accord MARK A. DELUCCHI, UCD-ITS-RR-96-3 (9) REv. 1, SUMMARY OF
THE NON-MONETARY EXTERNALTIES OF MOTOR VEHICLE USE 49-51 (rev. Oct. 2004), available at

http://www.its.ucdavis.edu/publications/2004/UCD-ITS-RR-96-03(09)_revl.pdf.
37. 2011 CAFE Standards, supranote 14, at 14,349.
38.

See infra Part II.

39.

2011 CAFE Standards, supranote 14, at 14,350.
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The DOT elected to apply a 3 percent discount rate to the social costs of
carbon. 40 This meant that in constant dollars, the social costs of carbon would
decrease over time. This approach contrasts with the IWG report, which has
carbon prices that increase steadily over time (in constant dollars), a point to
which we return below. 4 1
The DOT then ran a set of models meant to estimate the costs and benefits
of different CAFE standards and selected what it believed to be the "optimized"
rule-the one that would generate the greatest net benefits. The DOT reported
the results of its cost-benefit analysis for this optimized rule, along with rules
25 percent below (that is, lower mandatory fuel efficiency) and 25 percent and
50 percent above (higher mandatory fuel efficiency) the optimal. The DOT also
reported cost-benefit numbers for two other potential standards: 1) the standard
that would generate costs approximately equal to benefits; and 2) the standard
at the point of "technical exhaustion"-the greatest fuel efficiency possible
given current technology. The results of the DOT's cost-benefit analysis are
reproduced in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Benefits and Costs of Possible CAFE Standards
(Versus Baseline of No Action) Over Lifetime of Model Year 2011
Automobiles (millions of 2007 dollars) 4 2

Total
Benefits

Total
Costs

Net

Optimized

25%
Above
Optimized

50%
Above
Optimized

Total
Costs =
Total
Benefits 43

1,707

1,948

2,321

2,763

3,676

9,356

940

1,145

1,918

4,009

18,120

25%
Below
Optimized

2,545

_____

_____

767

Benefits_____________________

802

403

Technology
Exhaust

218

-334

-8,765

As part of this cost-benefit analysis, the DOT estimated that its optimized
regulation would eliminate 8.33 million tons of CO 2 emissions over the lifetime
of the model year 2011 automobiles. 44 It priced these emissions at $2 per ton,
for a total benefit of approximately $16 million.

40. Id. at 14,350, 14,355.
41. For instance, the IWG's median carbon prices (discounted at 3 percent) grow at an
approximate yearly rate of 2.1 percent, in constant dollars, between 2010 and 2020. See IWG REPORT,
supra note 17, at 40.
42. 2011 CAFE Standards, supra note 14, at 14,386 tbls.VII-4 to VII-6.
43. As is obvious from the numbers, costs are not quite equivalent to benefits under this
regulatory option.
44. See 2011 CAFE Standards, supra note 14, at 14,412-13 (summing the car and truck
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The agency tested this "optimized" rule to determine whether it was
sensitive to the choice of carbon price, and concluded that "the optimized
CAFE standards for [model year (MY)] 2011 cars and light trucks were
unaffected by the choice among those values for reducing CO2 emissions from
fuel production and use."45 In other words, the DOT claimed that it would have
selected the same "optimized" rule irrespective of the price it placed on carbon.
Yet it is difficult to know whether this assertion can be believed.
In order to determine whether the DOT's choice of regulatory standard
was in fact sensitive to the price it placed on carbon, it is necessary to know
how much each of the regulatory options would have reduced emissions by
model year 2011 cars. To the best of our knowledge, the DOT did not report
these figures for the lifetime of model year 2011 automobiles. However, it did
report expected reductions in CO 2 emissions from 2010 to 2100, assuming that
its regulatory standards remained in force during that time. Assuming that
emissions reductions from 2010 to 2100 are proportional to emissions
reductions for model year 2011 automobiles, we can calculate expected
reductions for model year 2011 vehicles under each regulatory scenario. Those
results and calculations are listed in Table 2 below.
Table 2: CO 2 Emissions by Passenger Cars and Light Trucks with
Alternative CAFE Standards for Model Year 2011 (million tons CO 2)46
Emissions
Emissions
Cumulative
Reductions from
Reductions Over
Alternative
Emissions,
2010-2100
the Lifetime of
2010-2100
Compared to No
Model Year 2011
Action Alternative
Automobiles
0*
0
210,279
No Action
209,076

1,203

7.44*

208,932
208,743

1,347

8.33*

1,536

9.50*

208,440

1,839

11.37*

Total Costs =
Total
Total Bets
Benefits

208,015

2,265

14.01*

Technology
Exhaustion

204,228

6,052

37.43*

Optimized

Optimized
25% Above
Optimized

50% Above
Optimized

values).
45. Id at 14,351.
46. See id. at 14,390 tblVI- 11. Values labeled with "*" were calculated, not reported from the
DOT regulation.
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Consider the results of this analysis if the social cost of carbon is priced at
the IWG's 3 percent discount value ($21.40 per ton in 2010). Let us suppose
that the lifetime emissions for model year 2011 automobiles are evenly
distributed across the years 2010-2021. If that is the case, the costs and benefits
are as follows:
Table 3: Benefits and Costs of Possible CAFE Standards (Versus Baseline
of No Action) Over Lifetime of Model Year 2011 Automobiles (millions of
2007 dollars) at IWG 3 Percent Discount Carbon Prices
Total

Total
Beefts
BenefitsI
Total

25%

25%

50%

Costs =

Below
Optimized

Optimized

Above
Optimized

Above
Optimized

BenefitS47

Technology
Exhaust

1,868

2,128

2,526

3,008

3,978

10,164

940

1,145

1,918

2,545

4,009

18,120

Costs

Net
Benefits

Total

II

948

983

606

463

-31
I

-8,044
I

The higher price for carbon does not alter the benefits so radically as to
make regulations "25% Above Optimized" or "25% Below Optimized"
preferable. But the gap in net benefits between these regulatory choices has
narrowed. Moreover, the "Optimized" CAFE standard is meant to be the
regulation that provides the greatest net benefits. With a different price on
carbon, that optimal point may well shift upward-perhaps not all the way to
25 percent above the current point, but at least somewhat above the DOT's
chosen standard.
In addition, these costs and benefits reflect model year 2011 cars only. If
the regulations remained in place and costs and benefits were computed for the
next ten, twenty, or fifty years, the regulations would generate even greater
reductions in carbon emissions. If those reductions were valued in accordance
with the IWG report, the "optimal" CAFE standards would be more stringent
(that is, require greater fuel efficiency) than the DOT's calculations reveal. This
is due in large part to the fact that under the IWG report the discounted social
costs of carbon increase over time, while the DOT proceeded on the
assumption that the discounted social costs will diminish with time. 48 Thus, if
47. As is obvious from the numbers, costs are not quite equivalent to benefits under this
regulatory option.
48. See lWG REPORT, supra note 17, at 40. In addition, the lower the discount rate, the faster
the rate of increase in the price of carbon. Thus, the lower the SCC discount rate, the greater the gap
over time between benefits calculated according to the IWG report and benefits calculated by the
DOT.
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the DOT's claim that its choice of CAFE standards was invariant to the price of
carbon is correct, it is likely correct only under a particular set of parameters
specified by the DOT itself. As the price of carbon and the regulatory time
frame increase, stricter CAFE standards appear more attractive.
B. Energy Conservation Standardsfor Fluorescentand IncandescentLamps

On July 14, 2009, the Department of Energy promulgated a regulation
setting energy efficiency standards for General Service Fluorescent Lamps
(GSFL) and Incandescent Reflector Lamps (IRL).49 More efficient fluorescent
and incandescent lamps reduce electricity consumption, and thus simultaneously decrease greenhouse gas emissions.50 In fact, according to the DOE's
analysis, the reduction in carbon emissions is one of the primary sources of
benefits from mandating more efficient lamps. 5 1
However, because this regulation was completed before the publication
of the IWG report, the DOE was also forced to rely upon other sources when
pricing the benefits of lower emissions. It chose to employ the DOT's prices
from its CAFE standards: $2, $33, and $80 per ton. 5 2 The DOE also decided to
increase these values by 3 percent per year "to represent the expected
increases, over time, of the benefits associated with reducing CO 2 and other
greenhouse gas emissions." 5 3 As with the CAFE standards, however, these 3
percent increases were not pegged to constant dollars.54 The DOE applied two
discount rates to the benefits and costs of its regulation: 3 percent and 7
percent.55 Thus, at 3 percent, the social costs of carbon are constant (in
constant dollars) over time; at 7 percent they decrease fairly rapidly. This is
again in contrast to the IWG, which concluded that the social cost of carbon
will increase steadily over time.
For each of these two types of lamps, the DOE considered five different
potential levels of energy efficiency, numbered in order of increasing
49. Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards and Test Procedures for
General Service Fluorescent Lamps and Incandescent Reflector Lamps, 74 Fed. Reg. 34,080 (July 14,
2009) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430).
50. The principal cost of such regulation is the greater expense required to produce more
efficient lamps, a cost that will most likely be passed along to consumers. See id. at 34,083-84
(predicting higher consumer prices).
51. See id Reducing consumption of electricity also produces other environmental benefits,
such as reducing emissions of sulfur dioxide, mercury, and nitrous oxide. Id We focus here on carbon
dioxide, as it is responsible for the lion's share of the benefits and is most subject to uncertainty in
pricing.
52. See id. at 34,163; supra Section II.A.
53. Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards and Test Procedures for
General Service Fluorescent Lamps and Incandescent Reflector Lamps, 74 Fed. Reg. at 34,163.
54. Id. at 34,162 ("DOE converted the estimated yearly reductions in CO 2 emissions into
monetary values that represented the present value, in that year, of future benefits resulting from that
reduction in emissions, which were then discounted from that year to the present using both 3-percent
and 7-percent discount rates.").
55. Id at 34,164.
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stringency. That is, the higher the number, the greater the energy efficiency that
would be required. The DOE calculated the benefits of reduced carbon
emissions for the two lamps at each of these five potential levels of efficiency,
and at the 3 percent and 7 percent discount rates. The DOE's estimates of
reduced CO2 emissions are presented as ranges. In the interests of simplicity we
focus here only on IRL, though the analysis is the same for both types of lamps.
The DOE's results are displayed below.
Table 4: Estimates of Value of CO2 Emissions Reductions for IRL by Level
of Regulation at 7 Percent and 3 Percent Discount Rates56
Estimated Value of estimated CO 2 emission
cumulative reductions (billion 2008$) at 7%

Value of estimated CO 2 emission
reductions (billion 2008$) at 3%

Regulation
CO 2
discount rate
discount rate
emission
Level
reductions
from 2012 CO 2 value CO 2 value CO2 value CO2 value CO 2 value CO 2value
of $2/ton of $33/ton of $80/ton of $2/ton of $33/ton of $80/ton
to 2042
(MMt)

_

1

7 to 20

0.0 to 0.0

0.1 to 0.3

0.3 to 0.8

0.0 to 0.0

0.3 to 0.7

0.6 to 1.7

2

19 to 49

0.0 to 0.1

0.4 to 0.8

0.8 to 2.1

0.0 to 0.1

0.7 to 1.7

1.6 to 4.1

3

38 to 85

0.0 to 0.1

0.7 to 1.5

1.7 to 3.6

0.1 to 0.2

1.3 to 2.9

3.2 to 7.1

4

44 to 106

0.0 to 0.1

0.8 to 1.8

1.9 to 4.4

0.1 to 0.2

1.5 to 3.7

3.7 to 8.9

5

53 to 118

0.1 to 0.1

1.0 to 2.0

2.3 to 4.9

0.1 to 0.2

1.8 to 4.1

4.5 to 9.9

The DOE then calculated the annual benefits (net of costs) at each level of
regulation. It offered "primary," "low," and "high" estimates of these benefits.
The "primary" estimate is the DOE's best guess, given an intermediate price of
carbon (approximately $33 per ton) and median estimates of the reduction in
emissions. The "low" and "high" estimates are based on lower and higher
estimates of both price and emissions. The DOE reported net benefits at
discount rates of 3 percent and 7 percent. The results are displayed below, with
the level of regulation that would provide the highest net benefit (for each
emissions estimate and discount rate) in bold.

56.

Id. at 34,164 tbl.VII.28.

HeinOnline -- 99 Cal. L. Rev. 1570 2011

2011]

CLIM4 TE REGULA TION AND COST-BENEFITANALYSIS

1571

Table 5: Annualized Benefits Net of Costs for IRL by Level of Regulation
(in $millions/year for the period 2012-2042)"
Regulation Primary estimate at
Low estimate at
High estimate at
Level
discount rate:
discount rate:
discount rate:

1
2
3
4
5

7%

3%

7%

3%

7%

3%

18
326
459
532
621

29
352
532
590
687

-9
203
297
179
247

-2
215
339
207
280

44
449
620
885
994

61
489
725
973
1093

These tables make clear that the optimal level of regulation depends upon
the price of carbon and estimated emissions reductions. Consider Table 5,
which reports the net benefits of IRL regulation. At low estimates of emissions
and price, Level 3 regulation provides the greatest net benefits. Indeed, the
advantages over Levels 4 and 5 are quite pronounced. But at primary or high
estimates, Level 5 regulation is optimal and provides substantially greater net
benefits than Levels 3 or 4. In addition, it is hard to know where the crossover
point lies. There are obviously carbon prices and emissions estimates above
the "low" estimates at which Level 3 is optimal, and there are also prices and
emissions estimates below the "primary" estimates at which Level 5 is
superior. Indeed, there may be some combination of price and emissions
between the low and primary estimates at which Level 4 regulation provides
the greatest net benefits.
In the end, the DOE opted to regulate IRL (and GSFL) at Level 4, despite
the cost-benefit advantages of requiring greater energy efficiency.58 The agency
concluded that Level 5 regulation was "economically [unljustified," contrary to
the results of its own cost-benefit analysis, because it would place excessive
burdens on producers and some consumers who would be forced to pay higher
prices for more efficient lamps.5 9 In some sense, then, the choice of a price for
carbon was irrelevant to the final regulatory decision. But if the agency had
followed its own cost-benefit analysis, the particular price put on carbon
emissions would have been important-and perhaps decisive.

57.

See id. at 34,170-71 tbl.VII.34.

58.

Id. at 34,169-73.

59. See id. at 34,172. We have our doubts about the normative soundness of this conclusion.
See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against FeasibilityAnalysis, 77 U. CtHI. L. REV. 657 (2010).
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C. Energy ConservationStandardsfor Small Electric Motors

The first regulation to employ the IWG's SCC was the Department of
Energy's Energy Conservation Standards for Small Electric Motors,
promulgated on March 9, 2010.6 The IWG report was first published as an
appendix to this rule,61 and to our knowledge it has not been published again
since. As the title indicates, this regulation mandates energy efficiency
guidelines for two types of small electric motors: "polyphase" small electric
motors and "capacitor-start" small electric motors.62 For each of these two
types of motors, the DOE considered eight different potential levels of energy
efficiency, numbered in order of increasing stringency. 63 The regulatory levels
for capacitor-start motors are numbered 1 through 8; the levels for polyphase
motors are numbered 1 through 7, with an additional level "4b" that represents
an adjusted set of regulations that the agency believed would more closely
approach optimal levels. The DOE then examined the effect of each potential
regulation on carbon dioxide emissions from 2015, when the regulation will
take effect, until 2045.64 It estimated the likely reductions in CO 2 emissions that
would result from increased efficiency (and thus diminished need for electrical
power generation), and then priced the benefits of these reduced emissions
using the four different carbon prices reported by the IWG. Again, in the
interests of simplicity, we focus here only on polyphase motors, though our
analysis of capacitor-start motors is essentially the same. The DOE's results are
as follows:

60. See Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Small Electric
Motors, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,874, 10,909 (Mar. 9,2010) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 431).
61. See id. at 10,911 (referencing "Appendix A of the Annex to Chapter 15 of the Technical
Support Document").
62. Id. at 10,932. For our purposes, the differences between these two types of motors are
irrelevant. We mention them both only to explain that the agency's analysis proceeded in two parts.
63. Again, the higher the number, the greater the energy efficiency that would be required.
64. Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Small Electric Motors,
75 Fed. Reg. at 10,931.
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Table 6: Estimates of Global Present Value of CO 2 Emissions Reductions
for the Period 2015-2045 Under Polyphase Small Electric Motor Trial
Standard Levels 65
Global value of CO 2 emission reductions,
Estimated
5%
cumulative CO 2
discount
emission
Regulation
rate
reductions, Mt
Level

million$ 2009
2.5%
3%
discount discount
rate
rate

3% discount
rate, 95th
percentile

1

2.3

8

40

68

122

2

4.6

16

81

138

248

3

8.3

28

146

248

445

4

9.3

32

165

280

502

4b

15.4

52

272

462

828

5

18.3

62

323

550

986

6

19.5

66

344

585

1049

7

21.2

72

375

638

1144

As an initial matter, it is difficult to determine whether the DOE has in
fact priced its own carbon reductions correctly. Take, for instance, the very first
row of Table 6 (Level 1 regulation). The DOE estimated that this level of
regulation would reduce CO 2 emissions by 2.3 million tons from 2015 to 2045.
According to the IWG report, the price of one ton of CO 2 in 2015 is $5.70 at a
5 percent discount rate.66 That price only rises over the next thirty years,
reaching $14.20 in 2045. 6 In addition, the IWG prices are in 2007 dollars,
while the dollar values reported in the DOE regulation are in 2009 dollars,
which are less valuable. Thus, the global value of CO 2 emission reductions at
Level 1 should be at minimum $13 million, and actually much more.68 Yet the
regulation values these CO 2 reductions at only $8 million. This problem exists
for each of these calculations, and we cannot explain these discrepancies.
The DOE then calculated the benefits of regulation (net of costs) for the
two types of motors, at eight possible levels of regulation, across the four
standard prices for carbon dioxide from the IWG report. The results are

65.

Id. at 10,931-32 tbl.VI.31.

66.

IWG REPORT, supra note 17, at 40.

67.
68.

Id.
See Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Small Electric
Motors, 75 Fed. Reg. at 10,931-32 tbl.VI.31. 2.3 million tons of CO 2 at $5.70 comes to $13.11
million. However, the overall figure must be higher because 1) the regulation reports values in 2009
dollars while the IWG report lists carbon dioxide prices in 2007 dollars; and 2) the social costs of
carbon are greater than $5.70 in every year subsequent to 2015.
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displayed in Table 7 (polyphase motors). The level of regulation that will
provide the highest net benefit at each price of carbon is in bold.
Table 7: Total Net Benefits at Various Social Costs of Carbon for
Polyphase Small Electric Motors (2015-2045)6
Regulation
Consumer NPV (in billion$ 2009) at 3% discount rate with:
Level
CO2 value of
CO2 value of CO2 value of
CO2 value of
$4.7/metric ton $21.4/metric
$35.1/metric
$64.9/metric
CO2
ton CO 2
ton CO2
ton CO2
1
0.27
0.30
0.33
0.39
2
0.57
0.64
0.69
0.81
3
1.04
1.16
1.27
1.47
4
1.08
1.22
1.34
1.57
4b
1.49
1.73
1.92
2.29
5
0.83
1.11
1.34
1.79
6
0.13
0.42
0.66
1.14
7
(12.57)
(12.26)
(11.99)
(11.47)
As the reader can observe, the level of regulation that provides the
greatest net benefits is not affected by the choice of carbon price. For polyphase
motors, Level 4b delivers the greatest net benefits irrespective of the price of
carbon dioxide. It is on the basis of this finding that the DOE concluded that the
choice of regulatory level was invariant to the choice of carbon price. 70
Yet it is clear that this conclusion is an artifact of the particular potential
levels of regulation the DOE chose to analyze. If the DOE had not included
Level 4b in the analysis, its choice of regulation would depend on the price it
attached to CO 2 emissions. Per Table 7, if CO2 emissions are priced at $4.70 or
$21.40 per ton, Level 4 provides the greatest net benefits. If emissions are
priced at $35.10 per ton, Levels 4 and 5 provide equivalent benefits. And if
emissions are priced at $64.90 per ton, Level 5, a more energy-efficient
standard, provides the greatest benefits. The DOE evades a decision between
Levels 4 and 5 by settling on an intermediate option-Level 4b-that is
superior to both. But this raises the implication that there may be other
intermediate possibilities-imagine Level "4a" or "4c"-that are superior to
Level 4b at some prices of carbon and inferior at others.
Once again, it is the agency's decision to consider only particular discrete
regulatory options, rather than an entire continuum of possibilities, that allows

69.
70.

Id at 10,935-36 tb.VI.41.
See id; see also id at 10,939-40 (summarizing the DOE's conclusions).
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it to conclude that it should impose the same regulation regardless of the price
of carbon. The agency chooses its options-for example, Level 4b, but not
Levels "4a" or "4c"-such that one level of regulation is superior to all others
at each of the four carbon prices. But that is quite different than saying that the
optimal level of regulation is unrelated to the price of carbon. In fact, the
agency was most likely compelled to investigate Level 4b precisely because the
choice between Level 4 and Level 5 depended entirely on the social cost of
carbon. Accordingly, the Department of Energy, like the Department of
Transportation, will not be able to avoid choosing a price for CO 2 emissions
when making regulatory decisions.
D. FurtherAgency Regulation Involving the SCC

We have discussed three of the fourteen regulations that report an SCC.
Of the remaining regulations, seven involved the Department of Energy: air
conditioners and heat pumps; commercial refrigerators and freezers; residential
gas ranges and ovens; commercial heating, air conditioning, and water-heating
equipment; refrigerated bottled or canned beverage vending machines;
residential water heaters, direct heating equipment, and pool heaters; and
commercial clothes washers.7 Two of the remaining regulations involved the
Department of Transportation: applications for funding under the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act and for funding for national infrastructure.72
One involved the EPA: fuels and fuel additives. And one involved both the
DOT and the EPA: vehicle emissions. 74 The DOT and the EPA have since

71. Energy Conservation Standards for Residential Water Heaters, Direct Heating Equipment,
and Pool Heaters, 75 Fed. Reg. 20,112 (Apr. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430); Energy
Conservation Standards for Certain Consumer Products and for Certain Commercial and Industrial
Equipment, 75 Fed. Reg. 1122 (Jan. 8, 2010) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 431); Energy
Conservation Standards for Refrigerated Bottled or Canned Beverage Vending Machines, 74 Fed. Reg.
44,914 (Aug. 31, 2009) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 431); Energy Conservation Standards and Test
Procedures for Commercial Heating, Air-Conditioning, and Water-Heating Equipment, 74 Fed. Reg.
36,312 (July 22, 2009) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 431); Energy Conservation Standards for
Certain Consumer Products and for Certain Commercial and Industrial Equipment, 74 Fed. Reg
16,040 (Apr. 8, 2009) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430); Energy Conservation Standards for
Commercial Ice-Cream Freezers; Self-Contained Commercial Refrigerators, Commercial Freezers,
and Commercial Refrigerator-Freezers Without Doors, 74 Fed. Reg. 1,092 (Jan. 9, 2009) (to be
codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 431); Energy Conservation Program for Commercial and Industrial
Equipment: Packaged Terminal Air Conditioner and Packaged Terminal Heat Pump Energy
Conservation Standards, 73 Fed. Reg. 58,772 (Oct. 7, 2008) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 431).
72. Notice of Funding Availability for the Department of Transportation's National
Infrastructure Investments Under the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act for 2010, 75 Fed. Reg. 30,460-02 (June 1, 2010); Notice of Funding
Availability for Supplemental Discretionary Grants for Capital Investments in Surface Transportation
Infrastructure Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 28,755 (June 17,
2009).
73. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Changes to Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 75
Fed. Reg. 14,670 (Mar. 26, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
74. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel
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proposed a fifteenth regulation, also concerning vehicle emissions.7 5 Unlike
most prior regulations, these last two DOT/EPA actions specifically mention
greenhouse gas regulation as among their primary goals. 7 6
All of the regulatory impact statements accompanying these regulations
resemble the three discussed above. They typically report a range of SCCs,
with the statements for the most recent regulations using the IWG's figures.
And they all exclude the SCCs from the actual cost-benefit analysis, instead
merely reporting them or using them in a sensitivity analysis.
Meanwhile, the EPA has begun deliberating about climate regulation
under the Clean Air Act. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held
that if anthropogenic carbon dioxide is leading to global warming and causing
harm to humans, it is an "air pollutant" under the Clean Air Act and the EPA
must regulate it. On December 7, 2009, the EPA announced its conclusion
that greenhouse gases threaten public health.79 This finding authorizes the EPA
to regulate CO2 emissions in a variety of ways, including requiring CO2
emitters to install the "best available" technology to mitigate emissions.80 Such
regulation would impose significant costs on the U.S. economy, but it might
also produce substantial benefits by dramatically reducing carbon dioxide emissions and mitigating the negative effects of global warming. Its effects would
overshadow the comparably trivial regulations that we have discussed so far.
The EPA is at a very early stage in the process of regulating carbon
dioxide under the Clean Air Act-it has not published proposed regulatory text
or officially solicited comments from private parties.i In fact, the Obama
administration has indicated that the EPA's finding is principally intended to
compel Congress to pass greenhouse gas legislation.82 The EPA has taken the
Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600;
49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536, 537, 538).
75. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and
Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 75 Fed. Reg. 74,152 (proposed Nov. 30, 2010) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 1036, 1037, 1065, 1066, 1068; 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 534, 535).
76. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and
Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 75 Fed. Reg. at 74,152 ("Reducing fuel consumption ... directly
reduces the motor vehicle tailpipe emissions of carbon dioxide (C02), which is the principal
greenhouse gas emitted by motor vehicles."); Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards
and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. at 25,324 ("This joint Final Rule is
consistent with the National Fuel Efficiency Policy announced by President Obama on May 19, 2009,
responding to the country's critical need to address global climate change and to reduce oil
consumption.").
77. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
78. Id. at 533.
79. News Release, EPA, EPA: Greenhouse Gases Threaten Public Health and the
Environment
(Dec. 7, 2009),
available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/
08dl la45113 1bca585257685005bf252.
80. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
81. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (describing the rulemaking process that the EPA must undertake
before regulating).
82.

See Sindya N. Bhanoo, The E.P.A. Announces a New Rule on Polluters,N.Y. TIMES, May
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more limited step of requiring that major CO2 emitters-those that produce
more than 100,000 tons of carbon dioxide per year--obtain permits and install
the best available technology before initiating new sources of pollution.
However, in the cost-benefit analysis that accompanied that regulation, the
EPA refused to quantify the benefits of reduced carbon emissions, deeming
them too uncertain. 4 It did not so much as mention the SCC. If Congress does
not act and the EPA eventually promulgates much broader CO 2 regulation, it
will be essential that the agency conduct a full cost-benefit analysis in order to
ascertain whether such regulation is justified. An essential component of that
cost-benefit analysis, perhaps the preeminent part, will be a calculation of the
benefits of reduced carbon emissions.
II.
PROBLEMS WITH CALCULATING A SOCIAL COST OF CARBON

In this Part, we turn our attention to the Interagency Working Group's
report on the Social Cost of Carbon, the definitive federal administrative statement on the subject. We demonstrate that it suffers from a variety of problems
that render its conclusions unconvincing. At a fundamental level, the IWG's
errors are its failure to recognize the political nature of certain issues, treating
them instead as technical matters, and its failure to recognize the technical
nature of other issues, seeking political solutions where none were available.
A. The IWG Report

We begin with a discussion of the IWG's method for pricing carbon. The
IWG's estimate of the social costs of carbon is based on predictions derived
from three separate computer models of climate change and economic harm.
These models, all developed by academics and widely used in estimating future
climate harms, are known as DICE (Dynamic model of Integrated Climate and
the Economy), 85 PAGE (Policy Analysis of the Greenhouse Effect), 86 and

14, 2010, at A13.

83. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75
Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71). We describe this
regulation as more limited both because it regulates only a small subset of carbon emitters and because
the impact of requiring that even a large emitter install the "best available" technology will likely be
"relatively small." Id. at 31,600. This is "due to the lack of available capture and control technologies"
for carbon dioxide. Id. The D.C. Circuit rejected a motion to stay this regulation, Coal. for Responsible
Regulation, Inc. v. E.P.A., No. 09-1322 et al., 2010 WL 5509187 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 10, 2010), and the
regulation took effect on January 2, 2011.
84. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75
Fed. Reg. at 31,598-601.
85. William Nordhaus, an economist at Yale University, developed DICE. See WILLIAM
NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: WEIGHING THE OPTIONS ON GLOBAL WARMING POLICIES
(2008); WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD: ECONOMIC MODELS OF
GLOBAL WARvING 4-5 (2000).

86.

Chris Hope, of the Cambridge University Judge Business School, developed PAGE. See
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FUND (Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation, and Distribution).
The three models differ in some significant respects (several of which are
described below), but for the most part, they operate in a similar fashion. The
user enters a set of economic parameters, including preexisting baseline
projections of economic growth and technological improvements, developed
within the standard economic literature.88 These projections include predictions
of future greenhouse gas emissions, which are a function of GDP and a
society's "carbon intensity": the amount of carbon a nation's economy must
generate in order to produce wealth. 89
From these projected emissions, the climate models predict changes in the
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. 90 Those changes in
greenhouse gas concentrations are, in turn, used to predict changes in
temperature, and the models then project economic harms (in the form of
diminished worldwide GDP) from the expected temperature increases.91 These
models thus involve both climate science-translations of greenhouse gas
concentrations into temperature changes-and environmental economicspredictions of the effect of warming on GDP.
In order to generate values for the social costs of carbon, the Interagency
Group ran the three models using standard baseline projections of economic
growth and technological development (the parameters described above) and
determined the models' predicted effects of warming on GDP.92 The models
are all probabilistic, and thus they each generate a probability distribution of
possible outcomes. 93 The Interagency Group obtained the mean outcome for
each model, and then averaged these three means. 94 The Group then re-ran the
same models using the same baseline projections, but with one additional ton of
carbon emissions, in order to determine the marginal effect on global GDP of

Chris Hope, OptimalCarbon Emissions and the Social Cost of Carbon Over Time Under Uncertainty,
8 TiE INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT J. 107, 107 (2008); Chris Hope, The MarginalImpact of C02from
PAGE2002: An IntegratedAssessment Model Incorporatingthe IPCC'sFive Reasonsfor Concern, 6
THE INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT J. 19, 20 (2006).

87.

Richard Tol, a professor at the Economic and Social Research Institute in Dublin,

developed FUND. See Richard S.J. Tol, Estimates of the Damage Costs of Climate Change. PartI:
Benchmark Estimates, 21 ENvTL. AND RES. ECON. 47, 50 (2002); Richard S.J. Tol, Estimates of the
DamageCosts of Climate Change. PartII: Dynamic Estimates, 21 ENVTL. AND RES. ECON. 135, 137

(2002).
88. The IWG report employed five sets of parameters derived from the Stanford Energy
Modeling Forum exercise. See IWG REPORT, supra note 17, at 16.
89. Abebe & Masur, supra note 1, at 360. Not surprisingly, carbon intensity is primarily a
function of a society's level of technology: higher-technology societies are able to produce greater
wealth with lower pollution. Id.
90.

IWG REPORT, supranote 17, at 6.

91.

Id.

92.

Id. at 5.

93.

Id. at 24-25.

94.

Id. at 5, 25.
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that additional unit of carbon.95 The average reduction in GDP across all three
models from this second run, minus the average reduction in GDP from the first
(baseline) run, is the social cost of carbon: the amount of money saved for
every marginal ton of atmospheric carbon that is not emitted.
Rather than declare a single value for the social cost of carbon, the IWG
reports different values for every year from 2010 to 2050.96 The yearly values
differ both because the cost of carbon must be discounted to present value, and
because one additional unit of carbon will likely affect the environment
differently in 2020 than it did in 2010. This is due to the fact that the
relationship between atmospheric concentrations and carbon is not linear, and
there will likely be more carbon in the atmosphere in 2020 than in 2010.
Accordingly, an additional ton of carbon will likely cause greater warming in
2020 than it did in 2010 because it will combine with an already carbonsaturated atmosphere.
The IWG does not specify a discount rate.97 Instead, the IWG reports
average social costs of carbon at discount rates of 5 percent, 3 percent, and 2.5
percent.9 8 The IWG also reports the ninety-fifth percentile probabilistic value
for the social cost of carbon (at a 3 percent discount rate), as a means of
providing something of an upper bound on the likely costs. The IWG predicts
that the additional harm from carbon emissions in later years will outpace the
rate of monetary discounting, even at a discount rate of 7 percent, and thus the
social costs of carbon increase with time in constant dollars. Table 8 reproduces
the Interagency Group's chart of social costs of carbon at various discount rates
from 2010-2021.
The use of these carbon prices in federal regulations is meant to be
straightforward. Suppose a regulation will reduce carbon emissions by 10,000
tons per year every year from 2010-2020. An agency would simply multiply
the emissions avoided by the price of a ton of emissions in the appropriate year
to calculate the full carbon-related benefit from the regulation. The agency
would need to choose which discount rate to use-but the IWG provides no
guidance on this issue. In this example, the regulation would generate a carbonrelated benefit of $2.62 million, assuming a discount rate of 3 percent.
Although the IWG methodology is relatively straightforward, this simplicity
masks significant shortcomings. Not only does the report ignore critical
pclitical questions by treating them as technical matters, a point to which we
will return in detail below, but the internal logic of the report's technical
methodology is itself fraught with problems.

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 25.
IWG REPORT, supra note 17, at 40-41.
See id. at 18-24.
Id. at 40-41.
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Table 8: Annual SCC Values: 2010-2021 (in 2007 dollars per ton) 99
Discount rate:
Year
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021

4.7
4.9
5.1
5.3
5.5
5.7
5.9
6.1
6.3
6.5
6.8
7.1

21.4
21.9
22.4
22.8
23.3
23.8
24.3
24.8
25.3
25.8
26.3
27.0

35.1
35.7
36.4
37.0
37.7
38.4
39.0
39.7
40.4
41.0
41.7
42.5

3%(95th
percentile)
64.9
66.5
68.1
69.6
71.2
72.8
74.4
76.0
77.5
79.1
80.7
82.6

B. Technical Problems Internal to the IWG's SCC Calculation

There is, to say the least, a great deal of uncertainty surrounding both
climate science and environmental economics. The IWG is admirably modest
and forthright about these limitations, and the last few pages of the document
list a number of analytical shortcomings.100 To begin with, the models do not
account for all potential non-catastrophic harms because of data limitations. For
instance, the models do not attempt to quantify the effects of ocean
acidification or the economic and political consequences of population
migration that result from warming.' 0' Nor do they account fully for the
possibility of catastrophic harm. For instance, the FUND model does not
account for the possibility of catastrophic harms of any sort, obviously biasing
its estimates of harm downward. The other models may be underestimating the
probability of catastrophic events by significant margins as well.102 In addition,
99. Id at40tbl.Al.
100. Id at 5 ("The interagency group offers the new SCC values with all due humility about
the uncertainties embedded in them."); id at 30-31 (describing limitations of the IWG analysis).
101. Id at 30.
102. Id at 30-33; see also Martin L. Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics
ofCatastrophic Climate Change, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1 (2009); Martin L. Weitzman, A Review of
the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, 45 J. ECON. LIT. 703 (2007). There are a

number of possible climate change-related "tipping points": points at which some drastic climatic
event occurs with potentially extreme economic or sociological consequences. These include, for
instance, the collapse of the Greenland Ice Sheet or the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, each of which would
raise sea levels substantially. Climate scientists estimate the likelihood of one of these events occurring
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each of the models assumes that humans will adapt at relatively low cost to
many of the results of climate change, though these assumptions are never
justified.103 Indeed, the rate and cost of adaptation is one of the foremost issues
that confounds attempts to estimate the costs of global warming.104 Finally,
each of the models assumes risk neutrality.!05 However, people are risk averse,
and insurance markets may not be able to handle the increased risk caused by
climate change.o Rather than calculate a rate of risk aversion and open itself
up to criticism for its choice, the IWG made the more politic (but less useful)
choice to elide the issue.
The IWG is to be commended for acknowledging the weaknesses of its
own analysis. But by the same token, the IWG's recommendations are not
adequately defended. Many of its errors are likely errors of underestimation: it
is likely that the IWG does not incorporate all the potential harms of global
warming, and thus underestimates the benefits of curbing emissions. But others
go the other direction. We describe three of the most significant errors and
shortcomings below.
The models use weakly defended assumptions. The models require the

input of a set of economic starting points: estimates of how economic growth
and technological development would proceed absent any global warming. The
models are obviously sensitive to these initial parameters: high economic
growth will lead to greater carbon emissions, and thus greater warming and
climate-related harms. In order to accommodate this uncertainty, the IWG used
five different sets of initial parameters, ran each model with each set of
parameters, and then took the average result across all three models under all
five sets of starting points. 10 7 Four of these initial sets of parameters were
at approximately 50 percent, assuming 2.5-degree Celsius global warming. IWG REPORT, supra note
17, at 33. These "tipping points" would not necessarily generate economic catastrophes (as they are
defined by the climate models), but it is worth noting that the probability of such an event occurring is
nearly an order of magnitude higher than the probability of an economic catastrophe under the DICE
or PAGE models. PAGE puts the likelihood of a catastrophe at nearly zero, while DICE estimates it at
4 percent, again assuming 2.5-degree warming. Id
103.

Idat3l.

104. Id at 10, 30-31 (describing the uncertainties surrounding the costs of adaptation and the
importance of arriving at reliable estimates); Alejandro E. Camacho, Transforming the Means and
Ends of Natural Resources Management, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 1405, 1412 (2011) ("[U]ncertainty is

amplified by the fact that the effects of global climate change on ecosystems will be influenced by two
other factors for which there remains limited information: the extent of mitigation strategies to be
employed to abate further climatic change and the collateral effects on biota from adaptation
strategies....") (citation omitted); Michael D. Mastrandrea, Calculating the Benefits of Climate
Policy: Examining the Assumptions of Integrated Assessment Models 30-37 (Pew Ctr. on Global

Climate Change, Working Paper, 2009), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/
mastrandrea-calculating-benefits-climate-policy-12-22-09.pdf.
105. IWG REPORT, supra note 17, at 31.
106. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, WORKING GROUP H,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 380-81 (2007) (contribution

of the working group to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC).
107. These five sets of economic parameters were borrowed from the Stanford Energy
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"business as usual" scenarios-best estimates of the current state of the economy and its likely growth over the coming decades.! 08 One of them was a more
optimistic set of parameters-it was actually named "MERGE Optimistic"that assumed that technological developments would limit atmospheric carbon
concentrations at relatively low levels for decades into the future.' 09
The IWG was right to average across a variety of initial economic
parameters as a means of addressing the uncertainty surrounding future
economic growth and the sensitivity of climate models to economic
projections. But what could be the justification for choosing four standard sets
of assumptions and one optimistic scenario? Why did the Group not employ
one pessimistic scenario, to balance its use of the optimistic scenario? It is
entirely possible that global growth will drive carbon emissions to levels
beyond what standard assumptions would predict. For instance, if the Chinese
economy continues to expand at a high rate and this expansion is fueled
primarily through coal and other dirty forms of energy production, global
carbon emissions could rise significantly faster than economists and scientists
currently predict.!10
This raises a larger issue regarding these parameters and the manner in
which they are employed by the models.' All of the economic parameters, and
all of the models, assume that worldwide carbon intensity-carbon emissions
per dollar of GDP-will decline steadily. They assume that the worldwide
economy will become "cleaner" over time, producing fewer and fewer carbon
emissions per dollar of GDP. This is a reasonable assumption for developed
economies that have already industrialized and are in the process of developing
cleaner technologies. But industrializing economies exhibit precisely the
opposite behavior: carbon intensity increases as the economy begins to rely
more and more heavily on coal and other carbon-intensive sources of energy,
and only decreases later once a certain level of technology and prosperity has
been achieved."1 2 For instance, Chinese carbon intensity rose through the late
1970s, and carbon intensity is still rising in parts of western China that are still
industrializing." 3 As other nations in Asia, Africa, and South America continue
to industrialize in the coming decades, carbon intensity in those regions may
well rise, rather than fall. This will not likely offset the overall decline in

Modeling Forum exercise. IWG REPORT, supra note 17, at 16. This modeling exercise developed ten
different sets of economic parameters; the Interagency Group selected five of the ten. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 16-17.
110. See Abebe & Masur, supra note 1,at 378-81.
Ill. See Daniel A. Farber, Modeling Climate Change and Its Impacts: Law, Policy, and
Science, 86 TEx. L. REv. 1655 (2008); see also Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking the Role ofCost-Benefit

Analysis, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 1355, 1386-97 (2009) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis cannot handle
climate change because of scientific uncertainty).
112. Abebe & Masur, supra note 1,at 362-66.
113.

Id.at353,369.
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carbon intensity throughout the world, led by technological advances in the
United States, Europe, and China. But it could render assumptions regarding
consistent declines in carbon intensity unrealistic and thereby indicate that the
IWG underestimates future harms due to climate change.
In another important respect the IWG's analysis may be overly optimistic.
None of the three models incorporates emissions of any greenhouse gas other
than carbon dioxide.114 A regulation that led to lower carbon emissions might
simultaneously cause industry to switch to fuels that generate higher emissions
of some other greenhouse gas such as methane (an even more potent greenhouse gas). If firms have the capacity to switch production from some activity
that generates carbon dioxide to another activity that generates methane, the
SCC will overestimate benefits from reductions in carbon emissions."
The models are crude and inconsistent. At the low levels of emission

reductions relevant here, the DICE, FUND, and PAGE models produce highly
divergent results. Recall that the models are probabilistic; they each produce a
range of possible outcomes of varying probabilities. FUND is the most optimistic: its median estimate of damage from global warming is lower than all but 5
percent of the estimates from the PAGE model."' 6 For its part, the median
PAGE estimate is lower than all but 5 percent of the estimates from the DICE
model. In other words, FUND estimates are at the extreme low end of PAGE
estimates, and PAGE estimates are at the extreme low end of DICE estimates.
What accounts for these inconsistencies? It is hard to be certain because
only the DICE model is fully transparent. The authors of the other models have
not released all of their equations and calculations to the public (which indeed
is an additional reason why it might not be proper for the government to rely on
them). But we can use the DICE model to illustrate a problem that, we suspect,
exists in the other models as well.
The central equation in the DICE model is:
Q(t) = Q(t)[1-A(t)]*A(t)K(t)TL(t)'Y,
where Q(t) is aggregate global economic output. The equation after the "*" is
just the standard neoclassical production function, where A(t) is factor
productivity, K(t) is capital stock, and L(t) is labor inputs. In the neoclassical
production function, economic output is a function of capital investment and
labor. Long-run growth is determined by technological innovation and
population changes, which are exogenously assumed. Although neoclassical
economic growth models have received criticism, they are consistent with
much empirical evidence, and are widely used.
114.

See IWG REPORT, supra note 17, at 13.

115. This inter-gas leakage is an echo of the even more serious problem of international
emissions leakage that we discuss below.
116. IWG REPORT, supra note 17, at 10. Recall that damages under these models are
probabilistic, and thus they produce probability distributions of possible damages.
117.

NORDHAUS, supra note 85, at 4 l.
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DICE's innovation is to multiply the neoclassical production function by a
damage function, Q(t)[1-A(t)], where Q(t) maps global mean temperature
changes to a damage variable, and A(t) maps abatement expenditures to an
abatement variable. As temperature increases, the damage percentage and
abatement costs increase, lowering aggregate economic growth. Because
capital spent on abatement expenses is diverted from capital devoted to
economic growth, aggregate output is maximized when the marginal cost of
abatement expenditures equals the marginal cost of climate-related economic
harm. The SCC can be backed out of this model: it is the price of carbon at
which the optimal investment in abatement will be made.
As we noted, the economic growth model is relatively uncontroversial, but
where does the damage function come from? Nordhaus explains:
The aggregate damage curve is built up from estimates of the damages
of the 12 regions, including assumed sectoral change and underlying
income elasticities of different outputs. It includes estimated damages
to major sectors such as agriculture, the cost of sea-level rise, adverse
impacts on health, and nonmarket damages, as well as estimates of the
potential costs of catastrophic damages. It is clear that this equation is
extremely conjectural, given the thin base of empirical studies on
which it rests.
"Extremely conjectural" is right. The damage function is essentially a guess.
And if, as we suspect, the models differ in large part because their authors
chose arbitrarily different damage functions, then the SCC just reflects the
average of these three guesses.119 If this is the case, it is hard to have much
confidence in the SCC calculated by the IWG.12 0
In addition, the manner in which results are reported, coupled with the
wide spread among the three models, conveys an excessively optimistic sense
of the potential magnitude of the climate risk. Recall that the IWG reports the
ninety-fifth percentile carbon costs (at a 3 percent discount rate) as a means of
establishing an upper bound on the likely benefits of emissions reductions.121
This ninety-fifth percentile figure is an average of the ninety-fifth percentile
values of all three models. But the models generate very different ninety-fifth
percentile predictions-for instance, FUND's ninety-fifth percentile value is
only a small fraction of PAGE's. Moreover, FUND does not include any
potential catastrophic outcomes. In this sense, the ninety-fifth percentile figure

118. Idat41-42.
119. The models use different economic growth models, but these are unlikely to be the source
of much difference, because all economic growth models attempt to explain the same thing-observed
economic growth in different countries.
120. For a general and somewhat more optimistic discussion of climate modeling, see
generally Farber, Modeling Climate Change and Its Impacts, supra note 111 (arguing that climate
models are more advanced than economic models in establishing lower-end estimates of the impacts of
global temperature change, and should have more influence on the policy-making process).
121. 1WG REPORT, supra note 17, at 26, 34.
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is not a realistic bound on the potential harm from climate change; it is a high
estimate mitigated by the much more optimistic figures produced by FUND.
Regulators (and the public) should not be misled into thinking that there is little
chance that carbon costs will exceed the ninety-fifth percentile figure reported
by the IWG.
To be sure, there is nothing wrong with using a variety of models that
make different predictions. Under conditions of uncertainty, this may be the
only wise course of action. But the extreme discrepancies between these three
models-FUND and DICE are essentially inconsistent with one another-does
not inspire confidence. It seems likely that one of the three models is simply
incorrect and is skewing the overall results improperly.1 2 2 It was perhaps an
overabundance of caution-both scientific and political-that led the
Interagency Group to employ all three models, rather than attempting to select
the most reliable one or two among them. If the IWG had excluded one or more
of these models, it might have opened itself up to criticism for having cherrypicked available science in order to buttress preferred conclusions. Yet the inclusion of an inaccurate model is no better than the exclusion of an accurate one.
The IWG assumes a linear relationshipbetween benefits and reductions in

emissions. That is, the IWG assumed that the benefit of reducing carbon
emissions by twenty tons in 2010 was exactly twice the benefit of reducing
emissions by ten tons in the same year: $428 vcrsus $214 (at a 3 percent
discount rate and an SCC of 21.4).123 This may be a reasonable assumption for
very small reductions in national emissions, but only for very small reductions.
The relationship between the amount of carbon emitted into the atmosphere and
the warming it causes could well be quadratic, cubic, or even exponential,
rather than linear. Similarly, the relationship between global temperature
changes and economic harm is likely nonlinear. Indeed, the DICE and PAGE
models assume that the relationship between temperature change and economic
harm obeys a power law: DICE assumes that economic damages increase as the
square of the change in global temperature, while PAGE uses a variety of
values ranging from a linear relationship to an assumption that damages
increase as the cube of temperature changes. 124 It is for this reason that the
IWG report is unsuitable for measuring the benefits of major greenhouse gas
regulation such as the EPA might undertake in response to Massachusetts v.
EPA. To its credit, the report itself is explicit on this point. 125 If the EPA is to
122. For instance, we find it remarkable that the majority of climate-related damages in North
America anticipated by FUND are in the form of increased demand for air-conditioning. See id at 8
n.4. We are not experts, but this hardly seems an accurate portrayal of the harm likely to befall farmers
and workers in North America in the event of significant climate change.
123. See IWG REPORT, supra note 17, at 2-3.
124. Id. at 7.
125. See id at 3-4 (stating that the purpose of the SCC figures presented in the report is
limited to "mak[ing] it possible for agencies to incorporate the social benefits from reducing carbon
dioxide emissions into cost-benefit analyses of regulator actions that have small, or 'marginal'
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calculate the costs and benefits of across-the-board regulation of carbon
dioxide, it must undertake a separate analysis and cannot rely upon a number of
simplifying assumptions made in the course of this report.
If a regulation causes only a very small reduction in overall carbon
emissions, it is appropriate to approximate these higher-order effects as linear
as the IWG report does. But it is possible that a number of independent
regulations, in combination, will together reduce emissions by more than a
small fraction. Over the past two years, federal agencies have promulgated a
number of regulations that are expected to cause significant reductions in CO 2
emissions, many of them in the millions of tons annually.126 For instance, the
Department of Energy's July 2009 regulation regarding the energy efficiency of
fluorescent and incandescent lamps is expected to reduce domestic CO2
127
emissions by more than 300 million tons over the next thirty years. If enough
of these regulations were put into force over the same period of time, they
could have nonlinear-quadratic, or even exponential--effects on global
warming. For instance, significant increases in CAFE standards, coupled with
improvements in energy efficiency standards for household appliances and
related policies, might lead to abatement of emissions that are too great to be
priced accurately using the IWG's analysis.128 The effects of these small
reductions in combination might be nonlinear, and might be more beneficial
than the IWG's simple model would indicate. By considering these reductions
in piecemeal fashion, agencies might miss significant interaction effects
between regulations. If this is the case, the IWG report would understate the
benefits from reducing carbon emissions by a significant degree.129

impacts on cumulative global emissions." (emphasis added)).
126. See supra Part l.
127. Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards and Test Procedures for
General Service Fluorescent Lamps and Incandescent Reflector Lamps, 74 Fed. Reg. 34,080, 34,164
tbl.VII.27 (July 14, 2009) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430).
128. See supra Part IIA.
129. On the other hand, the relationship could be less than linear, meaning that the Appendix
actually overstates benefits of reducing emissions. However, given the widespread belief among
climate modelers that damages scale more than linearly with increases in global temperature, this
seems unlikely. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, WORKING GROUP II,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 78 (2001) (contribution of
the working group to the Third Assessment Report of the IPCC) (presenting evidence that
environmental systems have "strongly nonlinear, complex, and discontinuous responses" to ecological
pressure); ROBERT U. AYRES & JORG WALTER, THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT: DAMAGES, COSTS, AND
ABATEMENT 4 (1991), available at http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Admin/PUB/Documents/RR-91-012.pdf
(stating that increases in CO 2 cause nonlinear ecological changes); SAMUEL FANKHAUSER, VALUING
CLIMATE CHANGE: THE ECONOMICS OF THE GREENHOUSE 60-61 (1995) (stating that each
subsequent ton of CO 2 released creates greater damage than the previously released ton of C0 2);
Darwin C. Hall & Richard J. Behl, Integrating Economic Analysis and the Science of Climate
Instability, 57 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 442, 443-44 (2006), available at http://upi-yptk.ac.id/Ekonomi/
Hall Integrating.pdf (arguing that the environment has a nonlinear response to changing inputs);
Timothy M. Lenton et al., Tipping Elements in the Earth's Climate System, 105 PROC. NAT. ACAD.
SCI. 1787 (2008), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/105/6/1786.full.pdf (describing several
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The IWG report is an admirable attempt to price the benefits of regulatory
reductions in CO 2 emissions. Nonetheless, it does not provide an adequate
scientific and economic basis for its conclusions. This may be due in part to the
IWG adopting "political" solutions, designed to appease all sides, where more
difficult technical decisions were called for. These problems, however, are at
least amenable to technical solutions through further refinement of the IWG
models. Perhaps more troubling, as we shall next discuss, are a number of more
fundamental problems that cannot be addressed in such a technical fashion.
C. InternationalLeakage andIts Role in Cost-Benefit Analysis

The carbon-absorbing property of the atmosphere is a global public good.
People everywhere in the world benefit when the atmosphere absorbs carbon
because the harmful effects of global warming and other disruptions to the
climate are avoided. When one country limits emissions, and other countries do
not, the first country provides benefits to the world, enjoys only a small share
of these benefits, and incurs the full costs of its behavior. The result is that
countries acting unilaterally will reduce carbon emissions inadequately.130
The IWG report recognizes this problem, noting:
Even if the United States were to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions
to zero, that step would be far from enough to avoid substantial climate
change. Other countries would also need to take action to reduce
emissions if significant changes in the global climate are to be avoided.
Emphasizing the need for a global solution to a global problem, the
United States has been actively involved in seeking international
agreements to reduce emissions and in encouraging other nations,
including emerging major economies, to take significant steps to
reduce emissions. When these considerations are taken as a whole, the
interagency group concluded that a global measure of the benefits from
reducing U.S. emissions is preferable. 3'

potential nonlinear climate change effects); Robert J.Nicholls et al., GlobalEstimates ofthe Impact of
a Collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet: An Application of FUND, 91 CLIMATIC CHANGE 171,

172-73 (2008), available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/cv0810423u037236/fulltext.pdf
(demonstrating the nonlinearity of damages created by environmental changes); Megan Ceronsky et
al., Checking the Price Tag on Catastrophe:The Social Costs of Carbon Under Non-Linear Climate

Response 18 (Econ. & Soc. Res. Inst., Working Paper No. 392, 2011), available at http://www.esri.ie/
UserFiles/publications/WP392/WP392.pdf (demonstrating the need to account for nonlinear climate
responses in projections of marginal damages in costs assessment models).
130. For recent discussions on the inadequacy of CO2 emission reduction, see Robert N.
Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-TradeSystem to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REv. 293, 324-27 (2008) (advocating linking U.S. climate change regulations with foreign and
international regulatory scheme to achieve an optimal reduction in carbon emissions); Vandenbergh &
Cohen, supra note 21 (discussing the difficulty of using unilateral measures to incentivize Chinese
reductions in carbon emissions); Jonathan B. Wiener, Climate Change Policy and Policy Change in

China, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1805 (2008) (discussing the need for the United States and China to work
together to develop coordinated climate change regulations).
131.

IWG REPORT, supra note 17, at 11-12.
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The difficulty lies in the fact that other countries, with the limited exception of
the member states of the European Union, have not taken significant steps to
reduce emissions. Thus, it is wrong to calculate the SCC for U.S. regulation on
the assumption that other countries have taken those steps.
To understand why, one must understand the problem of leakage. Leakage
occurs when carbon-emitting activities in one country migrate to another
country where regulation of carbon emissions is weaker. Suppose, for example,
that the U.S. government limits carbon emissions of automobile manufacturers,
raising the cost of production, and hence the price of automobiles, and reducing
the demand for American-made cars. All else equal, American consumers will,
at the margin, stop buying American-made cars and instead buy foreign-made
cars that are not subject to the American-imposed carbon cap. As a result,
foreign automobile manufacturers will expand production and hence generate
greater carbon emissions-potentially offsetting or even exceeding the
reduction in carbon emissions that took place in the United States. Because the
harm to the climate is independent of the source of the emissions, the American
cap will have no effect on climate change. Its only effect will be job loss in the
short term, and, in the long term, a transfer of carbon-intensive industry from
American soil to foreign soil, which may well be less economically efficient (as
it requires transportation of cars back to the United States, loss of comparative
advantage efficiencies, and so on). 132
Leakage also occurs when regulation shifts consumption to unregulated
economies. Suppose that American climate regulation increases the cost of oil
for American industry and consumers, resulting in a decline in demand.
Because American demand for oil declines, and oil is bought and sold on a
global market, the global price of oil will decline. As the global price of oil
declines, people in other countries will buy more of it. Depending on the
precise shape of the supply and demand curves, the quantity of oil consumed in
the new equilibrium may be close to the quantity of oil consumed prior to the
introduction of American climate regulation. Foreign-produced oil originally
intended for the American market will be sent to other countries, outside of
American regulatory control. In this extreme scenario, leakage is 100 percent,
with the result that the American regulation produces no social gains and only
costs (higher prices for American consumers).
However, there are two constraints on leakage. The first might be
described as physical or technological. In our first example, it may turn out to
be the case that the increase in the price of cars will have a limited effect on
demand since demand is relatively inelastic. Perhaps, for example, the cost of
transporting cars from overseas is very high or American automobile

132.

See, e.g., Mustafa H. Babiker, Climate Change Policy, Market Structure, and Carbon

Leakage, 65 J. INT'L EcON. 421, 439-40 (2005) (discussing the effects of international leakage on
bilateral trade).
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manufacturers simply produce more desirable cars.' 33 It is also possible that
foreign manufacturing processes are less carbon-intensive than American
manufacturing processes.1 34 In any of these cases, the reduction in carbon
emissions from American manufacturers will only be partly offset by the
increase in carbon emissions from foreign manufacturers. The extent of these
offsets will vary from industry to industry. In sum, leakage is not a problem in
markets that are local because of physical or technological constraints.
The second constraint is legal. Suppose the U.S. government enacts a law
that bans or taxes the importation of all foreign automobiles, or those that were
produced using carbon-intensive manufacturing processes. Such a law would
require foreign producers either to abandon the American market or to produce
less carbon-intensive cars for export to the United States. In either case, the
leakage problem would be mitigated. In reality, however, laws that address
leakage by restricting trade would have to overcome a number of hurdles,
including international trade law and the difficulty of determining the carbon
intensity of particular goods. Although such laws may help mitigate the degree
of leakage, it is unlikely that they could completely eliminate it.'35 Because
these laws do not yet exist, agencies must take leakage into account.
Scholars have produced a number of estimates of leakage. At this stage,
the estimates are highly speculative. A study by Joshua Elliott and his
coauthors considers the problem of leakage in a scenario in which Annex B
countries in the Kyoto treaty (major developed nations) adopt a carbon tax and
the non-Annex B countries do not.' 3 Using a new computable general
equilibrium model of the economic effects of climate change, they find that a
regional tax would reduce emissions only one third as much as an equivalent
global tax, and that the effectiveness of the regional tax would be reduced a
further 15-25 percent as a result of leakage.' 37 Constraints on emissions in the
European Union, the United States, and other Annex B countries would
133. Neither of these possibilities appears to be true, but they could be in other industrial
contexts.
134. This is likely true with respect to some countries, but not with respect to others. The
United States ranks eighty-second among the 134 nations (for which there are data) in the carbon
intensity of its energy production. That is to say, eighty-one countries produce less carbon per unit of
energy than the United States; fifty-two produce more. Carbon Intensity of Energy Use in 2007,
WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE CLIMATE ANALYSIS INDICATORs TOOL, http://cait.wri.org/cait.php?

page=carberg &mode=view (registration required). Notably, China, Australia, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
and Denmark have less carbon-efficient economies than the United States; Japan, India, Canada, and
the European Union countries, as a whole, are more efficient. Id. Though energy is not the only input
to production, the carbon efficiency of energy production is roughly correlated with the carbon
efficiency of production more generally.
135.

See generally Paul-Erik Veel, Carbon Tariffs and the WTO: An Evaluation of Feasible

Policies, 12 J.INT'L ECON L. 749, 755-60 (2009) (discussing the failure of specific European carbon
tariff proposals to completely eliminate leakage).
136.

Joshua Elliott, et al., A QuantitativeExamination of Trade and Carbon Taxes (manuscript

at 22-30) (on file with authors).
137. Id at 4.
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increase production and consumption of carbon-intensive goods by 15-25
percent in China, India, and other non-Annex B countries.
The leakage rate for the United States would be even higher if climate
regulation were to occur in the United States alone rather than in all Annex B
countries. Leakage would now occur not only to China and India, but also to
the European Union (the largest economy in the world), Japan (the second
largest national economy), Canada (the tenth largest), and Australia (the
thirteenth largest).138 Overall, leakage in a scenario in which the United States
alone (or the United States and the European Union) engages in carbon regulation, and other countries do not, would certainly be higher than 15-25 percent.
To account for this problem, agencies must incorporate leakage estimates
into their cost-benefit analyses involving the SCC. Consider a regulation that
reduces carbon emissions in the United States by one metric ton. Using the
IWG's figure for a discount rate of 3 percent, the benefit of the regulation
would be $21.40. If we conservatively assume that leakage is 25 percent, this
means that the one-ton reduction of carbon emissions will be offset by a
quarter-ton rise of carbon emissions in another part of the world. Accordingly,
either the agency should discount the expected carbon emission by one quarter,
or discount the SCC by one quarter. In either event, the benefit of the regulation
would be reduced to $16.05.
Unfortunately, the calculation would not be this simple. The Elliott et al.
study conflicts with other studies that estimate leakage rates from as little as 3
percent to more than 100 percent.139 None of these studies examines the
specific case where the United States (or the European Union) unilaterally
adopts significant constraints on carbon emissions. The studies also address
different types of leakage-for example, leakage that results from regulation of
coal versus leakage that results from regulation of petroleum, which need not
be the same. Agencies that regulate products like appliances that draw on coal
as their energy source must use leakage numbers different from those for motor
vehicles that draw on petroleum. Petroleum is traded on global markets to a
much greater degree than coal is, and thus susceptible to greater leakage.
138. Leakage would now occur not only to China and India, but also to the European Union,
Japan, Canada, and Australia. See FRANK CONVERY ET AL., M.I.T. JOINT PROG. ON THE SCI. & POL'Y
OF GLOBAL CHANGE, NO. 162, THE EUROPEAN CARBON MARKET INACTiON: LESSONS FROM THE
FIRST TRADING PERIOD 16-17, available at http://mit.dspace.org/bitstream/handle/1721.1/44619/
MITJPSPGC_Rptl62.pdf.
139. See Babiker, supra note 132, at 441 (estimating leakage rates as high as 130 percent and
as low as 50 percent for countries required to reduce emissions by the Kyoto Protocol); Mustafa H.
Babiker & Thomas F. Rutherford, The Economic Effects of Border Measures in Subglobal Climate
Agreements, 26 ENERGY J. 99, 106-08 (2005) (estimating leakage from 7-39 percent depending on
whether the United States is included in the Kyoto coalition countries and on what type of protective
measures, such as tariffs or exemptions, Kyoto coalition countries take to reduce leakage); TON
MANDERS & PAUL VEENENDAAL, NETH. BUREAU FOR ECON. POLICY ANALYSIS, NO. 171, BORDER
TAX ADJUSTMENTS AND THE EU-ETS: A QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT 23 tbl.4.4 (2008) (estimating
a 3.3 percent leakage rate for reductions made by the European Union).
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Similarly, regulations concerning production, such as the production of steel,
are much more susceptible to leakage than regulations concerning usage, such
as regulations of the efficiency of automobiles' 40 or small electric motors.141
Production can be transferred overseas to evade regulation, while usage by
Americans cannot. Further research into leakage rates will be necessary before
the SCC can be appropriately discounted.
In sum, leakage poses two problems. First, the degree of leakage in
current conditions is unknown. Second, and more important, cost-benefit
analyses that ignore leakage will overestimate the benefits of a regulation. The
amount of leakage will eventually depend on international cooperation, and in
particular, a climate treaty. How might agencies account for this? Agencies
might ignore leakage under the assumption that a climate treaty will eventually
come into existence. This would be wrong, however, as a climate treaty might
not ever be ratified. Or, agencies could assume that leakage is high. But if
agencies assume that leakage is very high, they will rarely engage in climate
regulation. We return to this dilemma in Part III.
D. Valuation ofHarms to ForeignCountries

Climate regulation is distinctive because optimal domestic climate
regulation depends on the climate regulation taking place in other countries.
This is not true for virtually all other forms of regulation. Consider regulation
of arsenic in municipal water supplies.142 The adverse effect of arsenic is felt
overwhelmingly by Americans; the cost of remedial measures also shows up in
the water bills paid by Americans living in the cities affected by the regulation.
Aside from a few tourists and other foreign visitors, the costs and benefits are
felt exclusively by Americans. By contrast, when American industry reduces
carbon emissions, the beneficiaries are mainly foreigners. The population of the
United States is less than 5 percent of the global population; and future
population growth will occur disproportionately outside the United States.
Accordingly, reduction of carbon emissions today will benefit far more
foreigners, living today and in the future, than Americans. Meanwhile, the costs
will be felt mostly although not exclusively by Americans. The foreign effects
of climate regulation create difficult methodological and normative questions
that we will examine in this Section.
Let us start by distinguishing the global SCC and the domestic SCC.
When U.S. industries emit an additional ton of carbon dioxide, the climaterelated harm will be partly felt by Americans and entirely felt by the global
population. For example, if global food prices increase as a result of harm to
140. See 2011 CAFE Standards, supra note 14.
141. Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Small Electric
Motors, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,874 (Mar. 9,2010) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 431).
142. See, e.g., National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 6981 (Jan.
22, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 142).
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agricultural productivity, the reduction in wealth will be felt mostly outside the
United States, where 95 percent of the global population is located.
Accordingly, the domestic SCC will be less than the global SCC. A cost-benefit
analysis that takes into account the well-being only of Americans will use the
domestic SCC; a cost-benefit analysis that takes into account the well-being of
the global population will use the global SCC. A cost-benefit analysis using a
global SCC will yield more stringent regulations than cost-benefit analysis
using a domestic SCC.
Should agencies such as the EPA use the global SCC or the domestic SCC
in its cost-benefit analysis? The legal answer is that it depends on the statute.
However, statutes are almost always silent about extraterritorial effect.
Consider the statute under which the EPA will regulate carbon emissions from
motor vehicles:
The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time
revise) in accordance with the provisions of this section, standards
applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes
of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his
judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. .. 143
The question is whether the relevant "public" in the statute includes only
Americans or the global population. In most statutes, two considerations would
suggest the narrower interpretation. First, courts frequently apply a canon of
interpretation that disfavors extraterritorial application of laws.144 The
presumption is that Congress has no interest in regulating overseas because
doing so may offend the sovereignty of other countries, while producing few
benefits for Americans. Second, the contrary interpretation implies that the
EPA should regulate, or attempt to regulate, foreign motor vehicle
manufacturers, even those who produce only for their domestic markets. Such
an interpretation is questionable, to say the least. 145
However, the Clean Air Act has a clause that provides for consideration of
extraterritorial effect with respect to countries that reciprocate by regulating
their domestic industry so as to benefit the United States.1 46 This suggests that
143. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006). The term, "air pollutant," means "any air pollution agent
or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive . . . substance
or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air." Id. §7602(g).
144. Recently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Morrison v. NationalAustralia Bank, 130
S.Ct. 2869 (2010).
145. For a recent explanation for the presumption of extraterritoriality in litigation involving
environmental laws, see generally Jonathan Remy Nash, The Curious Legal Landscape of the
Extraterritorialityof U.S. EnvironmentalLaws, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 997 (2010) (detailing recent courts'

reluctance to embrace extraterritoriality of domestic environmental regulations).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 7415(c) ("This section shall apply only to a foreign country which the
Administrator determines has given the United States essentially the same rights with respect to the
prevention or control of air pollution occurring in that country as is given that country by this
section.").
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neither the domestic nor global SCC should be used. According to this, the
SCC should be calculated so as to take into account impacts on countries that
enter a climate treaty or otherwise engage in climate regulation, and no others.
Notice how far removed this approach is from cost-benefit analyses which do
not limit benefits on the basis of the political behavior of governments.
The fourteen regulations that we have been discussing were not issued
under statutes with reciprocity provisions. Yet some of them distinguish
domestic and global SCCs. As we noted in Section I.A, the Model Year 2011
CAFE rule began with a $33 price for the global SCC. It then separately
calculated a domestic SCC on the basis of the U.S. share of world economic
output, about 20-28 percent, and estimates of the sensitivity of the U.S.
economy to climate change. 147 According to this calculation, the United States
would suffer between 0 and 14 percent of the global cost of climate change.
The DOT took the midpoint, 7 percent, and multiplied it by the $33 global
SCC, yielding a domestic SCC of approximately $2.148
The calculation is dubious. The cost of climate change is not a function of
the size of a country's economy, but its geography (for example, whether it is
low-lying and subject to flooding), its mean temperatures (hotter places suffer
more from increased heat than colder places), the health of the population
(healthier people are less susceptible to disease, which increases in warmer
climates), and so forth. Scientists have not yet been able to predict regional
variation in the effects of climate change with any confidence, and for this
reason the major climate models do not yet make predictions for individual
countries-although some economists have tried.149 Speculation as to the
sensitivity of the American economy to climate change is merely that. It
follows that even if a global SCC can be calculated, a domestic SCC cannot be
estimated to any reasonable degree of confidence-although we can be
confident that it is less than the global SCC.
Even if American regulatory agencies have the authority to take account
of costs to foreigners, should they use their discretion to act in that way? This
question can be broken down into three inquiries-normative, political, and
institutional.
The normative question is whether Americans have the same moral
obligations to foreigners who live overseas as they have toward other
Americans. If Americans have weaker moral obligations to foreigners, then
American regulatory agencies should partially or completely discount the
negative effects of American activities on foreigners. Philosophers take
different positions on this question. Cosmopolitans believe that moral

147. See 2011 CAFE Standards, supra note 14.
148. See supra Section I.A.
149. See, e.g., DELUCCHI, supra note 36 (attempting to calculate the effects of climate change
caused by motor vehicle use on the United States).
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obligations to help or not to harm others do not turn on their nationality;
communitarians and nationalists believe that they do.150 We do not take a
position on this debate; we note only that if Americans owe stronger duties to
other Americans than to foreigners, then the social cost of carbon should reflect
a discount for costs incurred by foreigners. And even if Americans should treat
foreigners the same as other Americans, there is still a question whether to
incorporate foreigners' own valuations, which, in fact, differ from those of
Americans, or to use American valuations-that is, to value foreigners' wellbeing the same as Americans value their own well-being.' Suppose, for
example, that Chinese and Italians assign a lower value to morbidity and
mortality risks than Americans. Should American regulatory agencies use
Chinese and Italian valuations or American valuations for climate effects on
Chinese and Italians? 52
The political question is whether elected officials and appointees who
head regulatory agencies should treat costs to foreigners the same as costs to
Americans even if they believe it is appropriate to do so--or, as a practical
matter, whether they can be expected to do so in a democracy. Suppose that
most elected officials are cosmopolitans but most Americans are nationalists.
For instance, one study suggests that Americans implicitly value a foreign life
at between 1/6th and 1/2000th of an American life. 153 Even if we should all be
cosmopolitans, it is plausible to believe that elected officials have a duty to
advance the interests of the Americans they represent, as do the regulatory
agencies that derive their authority from the decisions of elected officials. In a
more practical sense, electoral pressures may dictate that governments treat foreigners, who do not have the vote, differently from the way they treat citizens.
The institutional question addresses how regulatory agencies should act,
given that they have specialized missions. Even if the cosmopolitan view is
correct, and even if politicians believe that they should take account of the
interests of foreigners, it may well be the case that regulatory agencies should
not-unless explicitly directed to do so by elected officials.
With respect to the institutional question, there are two reasons for
doubting that agencies should treat costs to foreigners and costs to Americans as

150.

See generally SIMON CANEY, JUSTICE BEYOND BORDERS: A GLOBAL POLITICAL

THEORY 3-16 (2005) (describing competing approaches to international relations including the
cosmopolitan, realist, statist, and nationalist approaches).
151. See W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value ofa StatisticalLife: A CriticalReview
of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 26, 27-28 tbl.4, 29-30
(2003) (showing a range of valuations for a statistical life from $0.8 million in South Korea to $19.9
million in the United Kingdom, in 2000 U.S. dollars).
152. Cf Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, DollarsandDeath, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537 (2005)
(discussing how the law should assign dollar values to human lives).
153. Wojciech Kopczuk, Joel Slemrod, and Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Limitations of
Decentralized World Redistribution: An Optimal Taxation Approach, 49 EUROPEAN ECON. REV.
1051, 1075 (2005).
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the same. First, the treatment of foreigners is a diplomatic question, one that is
addressed by different institutions such as the State Department, the White
House, and sometimes Congress. To see the problem here, imagine that the
optimal approach to climate change is joint action by multiple countries, as is
surely the case.' 54 The United States and other countries do best if all countries
reduce greenhouse gas emissions by a reasonable amount.155 However, countries
disagree about how significant climate change is, and how the costs of responding to climate change should be allocated among countries. Countries must
resolve these disagreements-in effect, choosing a global SCC-before they can
cooperate. U.S. regulatory agencies cannot calculate the optimal SCC for U.S.
purposes until they know how foreign countries will act; and how foreign
countries will act depends in part on their negotiations with the U.S. government, which could be hamstrung if its own agencies committed it to specific
regulatory outcomes before it could obtain concessions from other countries.
It is possible that unilateral action by the United States will induce
reciprocal behavior by other countries. But the opposite is more probable: if the
United States reduces greenhouse gas emissions unilaterally, other countries
will fail to reciprocate, preferring to free ride.156 Suppose the United States can
compel other countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions only by threatening
not to reduce greenhouse gas emissions itself. If so, then it would be ill advised
for American regulatory agencies to reduce carbon emissions in a way that reflects the interests of foreigners until directed to do so by the political branches.
The Montreal Protocol is an example of how unilateral action by the
United States adversely affected its ability to negotiate further reductions with
other countries. The United States acted first, issuing regulations that greatly
reduced use of these compounds by consumers and domestic manufacturers.
When it came time to negotiate a treaty with other countries, the United States
had difficulty persuading them to take similar steps.157 These countries may
have preferred to free ride on American efforts, which conferred benefits on
them without imposing costs. The final treaty was less stringent than the United
States sought. 158 It is possible that this disappointment resulted from the selfimposed reduction in bargaining power on the part of the United States,
although one cannot know for sure.
The second reason for doubting that agencies should treat costs to
foreigners and costs to Americans as the same is that the treatment of
154. See, e.g., POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 1, at 29-33.
155. See Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARV.
ENVT'L. L. REv. 1 (2007).
156. See Rachel Brewster, Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block: Incrementalism and National
Climate Change Legislation, 28 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 245, 246-47 (2010) (arguing that incremental

domestic action may retard the development of an international agreement on climate change).
157. See Sunstein, supra note 155, at 9-17 (describing the negotiation process for the Montreal
Protocol).
158. See id.
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foreigners is a highly sensitive political question. Thus, Congress is the
institutional actor best positioned to decide these normatively and politically
fraught questions. As noted above, it is not clear whether elected officials
should take account of foreign interests to the same extent as domestic
interests. And as a practical matter, elected officials must pay attention to the
views of voters. If Congress will not act, then the administration should at least
employ notice-and-comment rulemaking in order to increase the degree of
political accountability and participation that attends the decision.1 5 9 An
interagency regulatory group, working behind closed doors with no public
notice or participation, is not the proper mechanism for resolving issues which
raise difficult political and moral questions and are not merely technical.160
III.
THE LIMITS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

Many of the problems in the IWG report are technical. The SCC chosen
by the IWG ignores some significant costs, neglects catastrophic risks, and
assumes away risk aversion. Because the figure assumes a linear relationship
between the benefits of carbon reduction and the quantity of carbon reduction,
it cannot be used for large-scale regulations or even small-scale regulations if
they aggregate to a large scale. The SCC reflects arbitrarily chosen damage
functions-or, more precisely, the average of several arbitrarily chosen damage
functions. 6' It emerges from three climate models of questionable reliability.
Guesswork is not always fatal to cost-benefit analysis. Judgment is needed
to distinguish between reasonable estimates and estimates that are excessively
wide of the mark. Our judgment is that the IWG report relies on too many
unwarranted assumptions and cannot be relied on. But technical problems can
be repaired through further research. Computer models of climate change are
improving and will eventually provide reasonable estimates of the SCC.
The more serious problem for cost-benefit analysis of climate change is
that climate regulation requires a series of judgments that are political and
institutional rather than technical. We review those judgments here.
First, optimal U.S. climate regulation depends on what other countries do.
If other countries do not engage in their own climate regulation, then U.S.
climate regulation should probably be less strict, given the possibility of
leakage. If other countries do engage in their own climate regulation, then U.S.

159. Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration,114 HARv. L. REv. 2245, 2358-68 (2001).
160. Similar to the treatment of foreigners is the treatment of benefits to people living in the
distant future. The treatment of such people is a normative question (typically discussed under the
rubric of intergenerational equity), not a technocratic question, and thus not one that can be answered
with cost-benefit analysis. See Eric A. Posner, Agencies ShouldIgnore Distant-FutureGenerations, 74
U. CHI. L. REv. 139, 143 (2007).
161. This is in addition to the fact that scientific uncertainty makes cost-benefit analysis
difficult. See supra Section II.B.
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regulators need not fear leakage as much and can regulate carbon more strictly.
Thus, a given regulation may be cost-justified if China also acts but not if
China fails to act. Yet cost-benefit analysis does not permit for speculation
about how other countries will behave. Agencies such as the DOT and the DOE
are in no position to predict whether China will regulate carbon or not, and so
cannot, consistent with the norms of cost-benefit analysis, use an SCC that
assumes action on the part of the China.
Second, climate regulation by the United States might itself affect how
other countries act. There are two possibilities. One is that if the United States
moves first, it provides leadership that motivates other countries to engage in
climate regulation. The other is that if the United States moves first, other
countries free ride and refuse to engage in climate regulation. Cost-benefit
analysis cannot predict the likely diplomatic consequences of agency actions.
Third, U.S. climate regulation will affect the well-being of many more
foreigners than Americans. Yet there is no agreed-upon formula for evaluating
the benefits of avoided harms for non-Americans living in other countries. An
agency might use American valuations; or it might defer to the valuations used
in foreign countries; or it might exclude foreign costs and benefits. The right
approach depends on normative questions that are prior to cost-benefit
analysis, and institutional and political questions that cost-benefit analysis
does not address.
Fourth, although a scientific consensus holds that anthropogenic climate
change will cause significant harm to people around the world, there is no
scientific consensus regarding how much of that harm will be experienced by
Americans in the United States. If cost-benefit properly takes into account only
effects in the United States, then agencies should engage in only limited
climate regulation compared to what they should engage in if it were proper to
take account of global effects.
The broader point is that cost-benefit analysis will be ineffective
whenever a regulation raises principally normative, political, and institutional
questions, rather than technical ones. This is why cost-benefit analysis is
considered inapplicable to abortion and Establishment Clause questions, for
instance. Without some mechanism for evaluating the normative and political
questions central to those subjects, cost-benefit analysis can lead one astray. To
be sure, policymakers should take into account the costs and benefits of various
approaches to climate regulation, but the costs and benefits-unlike in normal
cost-benefit analysis-are not the only considerations. They will have to make
an all-things-considered moral and political judgment that addresses scientific
uncertainty, the value of foreign lives, the likely reactions of foreign countries,
and the other imponderables for which cost-benefit analysis is not suited.
We suspect that all of these difficulties have caused agencies to avoid
relying on a single SCC in their regulatory impact statements, for fear that a
court would find the cost-benefit analysis defective because the SCC figures
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are unsupported. However, ignoring these problems does not solve them. As we
noted earlier, the Ninth Circuit struck down an earlier CAFE rule because the
DOT failed to take into account the SCC. 16 2
Yet if the IWG's cost-benefit analysis is not suited to the task of pricing
carbon, what should the government do? In an ideal world, the United States
and other countries would enter into a climate treaty that would establish the
SCC. Note that this SCC would be a political figure, reflecting a compromise
that different nations reach for political purposes, rather than a figure
determined using traditional economic methodology. The reason is that even
though the science and the economics is the same across countries, countries
make different political calculations which reflect local conditions. The SCC
that they can tolerate will thus reflect different political and institutional
factors; and the compromise SCC will reflect the relative bargaining power of
each country. But the figure could be easily plugged into cost-benefit analyses
used by agencies for regulation-at least, as long as agencies are given proper
executive or congressional authorization to use a politically stipulated figure
rather than the figure that emerges from climate models. A climate treaty could
also render agency regulation unnecessary by creating a cap-and-trade scheme
in which firms would be given tradable permits to emit limited greenhouse gas
emissions and would either pollute within the limits or purchase permits from
others. Because people would have to pay for the harm they cause to the
climate, they would fully internalize the climatic costs of their activity, and
additional regulation administered by the regulatory agencies would be
unnecessary. Congress would need to pass a law that requires the government
to use the treaty-based SCC so as to ensure that additional regulations beyond
American treaty commitments are not issued.
However, a climate treaty is still far off; what should U.S. regulatory
agencies do in the meantime? We believe that agencies conducting cost-benefit
analysis cannot use the IWG's SCC. The SCC is highly arbitrary: it assumes
that foreign harms should be treated identically to domestic harms; assumes
that there will be zero leakage; and assumes away the possibility of a
diplomatic solution. Even the choice of which of the IWG's four SCCs to use is
arbitrary. It may well be for this reason that agencies are at such pains to argue
that the choice of SCC will not affect the regulatory decision. As a matter of
policy and law, cost-benefit analysis cannot use arbitrary valuations.' It is
possible that a case could be made for a much lower SCC, using lower bound
estimates for American impacts that are scientifically supportable, or even for a
higher SCC. But we think that the more honest and plausible approach would
be for Congress to stipulate an SCC that reflects its political judgments.
162. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172,
1227 (9th Cir. 2008).
163. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (ordering courts to set aside agency action that is
"arbitrary [or] capricious").
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Congress would need to make the all-things-considered moral and political
judgment that we described above-one in which it takes account of scientific
uncertainty, the possible reactions of foreign countries, and the costs and
benefits, including the proper weighting of foreigners and future generations,
and so forth.
If Congress will not act, then the Obama administration should suspend
his cost-benefit analysis executive order6 for regulations touching on climate
change and order agencies to use a figure that will encourage other countries to
enter a climate treaty (if in fact such a figure exists);1 65 and initiate notice-andcomment rulemaking as a second-best means of addressing the political
questions that cost-benefit analysis cannot answer.
CONCLUSION

Contrary to popular perception, the U.S. government has already begun
engaging in climate regulation. Congressional paralysis on climate legislation
has not stood in the way because U.S. regulatory agencies derive authority from
their authorizing statutes and the cost-benefit executive order, which requires
them to take into account all the possible benefits of regulation.
That is the good news. The bad news is that the agencies' regulatory
efforts have been inadequate. Simultaneously miscalculating the SCC and
ignoring their own numbers, agencies manage to do cost-benefit analysis
poorly and then disregard it. Much improvement can take place through purely
technical adjustment, and the IWG has led the way. Many of the problems that
we have identified can be resolved through further research or reasonable
guesswork. But it is important to understand that although more precise domestic and global SCC figures can be useful information for political actors and
can greatly enhance the transparency of regulatory action, they cannot be used
in a conventional cost-benefit analysis performed at the agency level because
serious political issues remain as a result of the global nature of climate change
and the uncertainties that continue to surround it. For this reason, the existing
cost-benefit executive order does not provide a foundation for further climate
regulation. Congressional or executive intervention is necessary.

164. See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
165. Whether such an order would be lawful would depend on the proper interpretation of the
particular statutes involved, taking into account the conflicting pressures of the Chevron doctrine,
which confers discretion on the executive to achieve policy objectives, and the presumption against
extraterritoriality.
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